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THE CASE OF MEXICO



VICTORIANO HUERTA

THE CASE OF MEXICO

AND

THE POLICY OF PRESIDENT WILSON

BY

RAFAEL DE ZAYAS ENRIQUEZ

Author of "The Rise and Fall of President Diaz"

Translated from the Spanish

By ANDRE TRIDON

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PREFACE

In writing this book I have not been prompted by patriotic motives, however justifiable and reasonable such motives might appear, nor have I yielded to any partisan bias. My primary, perhaps my sole object, has been to acquaint the world with the real causes of the convulsion which is now shaking Mexico, my native country, its intensity and its significance, and with the actual principles which are at stake in this hour of agony; I also wish to show what a distorted conception the President of the United States has formed of the Mexican situation and what harmful consequences his attitude in the matter may have, not only for Mexico but for the United States as well.

Unless I possess definite evidence to the contrary, I always assume that all individuals are acting in good faith. I believe, therefore, that President Wilson has been and is moved by perfectly honest motives; he has started, however, from

erroneous premises and he has failed to foresee the consequences of the system he has endeavored to apply; he has failed to fathom the abyss towards which he is leading two neighboring countries which have nothing to gain from an international conflict.

A war between the two nations would be an utter disgrace, and its baneful effects, which would be felt all over the American continent, would alienate the sympathy of all the nations south of the Rio Grande from the United States.

A Mexican by birth, I have devoted my life to the study of my countrymen, my country and its history, and I consider myself fully conversant with everything that concerns Mexico. I have also spent several years of my life on American soil, studying this country carefully and without any preconceived opinions, and I believe I have a clear understanding of this nation which has always exerted a singular fascination over me.

This book, therefore, is neither an impassioned eulogy on Mexico, nor an attempt at justifying the acts of the pro-

visional government presided over by General Huerta, nor a fanatical attack on President Wilson or on the people whose destinies he is directing at the present time.

Such an attitude on my part would be both undignified and unprofitable, for it would only irritate the minds of my readers, instead of pacifying them, and would cast doubts on my construction of the facts, instead of carrying conviction.

I have attempted to be an impartial observer and to analyze all facts with equanimity; I have no wish to deceive anyone, not even myself; I do not, however, pretend to be infallible.

It is fitting that the world should know all the facts connected with the present situation in Mexico. I have written this book that the world may be cognizant of the whole truth before passing judgment upon Mexico.

RAFAEL DE ZAYAS ENRIQUEZ.

New York, January 1, 1914.

CHAPTER I

A LETTER TO FRANCISCO I. MADERO, PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF MEXICO
—MY ESTIMATE OF HIS POSITION IN
DECEMBER, 1911.

I never was a conspirator or a revolutionist, nor did I ever swear unconditional allegiance to any government. I was a partisan of General Porfirio Diaz from the day when he first presented his candidacy to the presidency of the Republic; I upheld his policy when he assumed the control of the government, and supported him until the year 1906, when I separated myself from him, expressing frankly and openly the reasons for my changed attitude.

I disagreed with his methods. I tried to make him see that he was heading the country unavoidably towards a revolution. I vainly pointed out to him the one way to prevent that catastrophe and then I resigned my seat in the legislature and

came to this country, a voluntary exile, and lived in New York until 1910.

In 1911, having been invited to take a position under the new government, I considered it my duty before asking for any post or accepting any appointment to write to President Madero the following letter which constitutes the logical introduction to my book.

New York, December 29, 1911.

TO FRANCISCO I. MADERO, Esq.,

President of the United States of Mexico.

My Dear Friend:—Our country is in danger. This is so obvious that even the most optimistic mind must recognize the fact.

When our country is in danger all of us who call ourselves patriots have a right to speak our minds and to point out the ways and means which, according to our experience, are the best to forestall that danger, and to concentrate our energies and our good will in an effort to save her. This conviction and my sense of duty prompt me to address these lines to you.

I did not approve of the revolution you headed; I accept it, however, not only as accomplished facts have to be accepted, but because it was the direct outcome of the state of affairs established and maintained for many

years by General Porfirio Diaz. As I have proved it elsewhere,* Diaz was the prime factor of that revolution; he prepared it, made it inevitable, caused it actually to break out. Upon him then must rest all the responsibility for everything that has happened, everything that is happening, and not a few of the things which the future holds in store.

But this does not relieve of all responsibility the men who took part in the revolution, the nation in general, and you in particular, since you find yourself to-day at the head of the government, to which position you were elected by a majority of the people to preside over their destinies.

In electing you they did not mean to reward you for your successful leadership of the revolution, but only to voice their confidence in your future actions and express the hope that you would regenerate the country, do away with all that was wrong, promote everything that would contribute to her final welfare and establish democracy on a firm basis.

When President Diaz fell from power he left the country in a precarious predicament. Things went from bad to worse under the administration of De la Barra. Since you have come into power the situation has become desperate.

* "Rise and Fall of Porfirio Diaz."

Let us not mention General Diaz. His actions have been judged and condemned.

As far as the provisional president De la Barra is concerned, I notice that many people have absolved him from all blame, have almost made a god of him, and are presenting him as an exemplary character, and his administration as a model for every patriot to admire. Those who see things more clearly and are less bent on flattering him concede that many wrongs were committed during his short term, but they excuse him on the plea that he was a mere figure head, carrying out your instructions, and that, to a certain extent, he succeeded in averting some of the pernicious consequences they would have had.

Others see a contradiction in his attitude, and say that if he was a mere puppet in your hands and lent himself to such a combination, he could not be called a strong character or even a political personality. The man who, being placed at the head of a nation, obeys anyone's commands when he knows such commands to be harmful, or even allows anyone to carry out in his name plans he considers harmful, is neither a statesman, nor a diplomat, nor a ruler worthy of his nation's respect.

Some people say that his attitude was dictated by a desire to preserve internal peace and enable the nation to hold orderly elections.

Others assert that he failed to maintain peace or to assure orderly elections, for his term of administration was marked by many uprisings and acts of brigandage which remained unpunished; the elections, they say, were absolutely one-sided, for rival candidates were not allowed to attend to their campaign work and were deprived of the most elementary guarantees. Whether or not these were your doings, the hand was that of President de la Barra, and he shall answer for it before the tribunal of history.

I neither condemn nor absolve Mr. de la Barra, for I have not the complete knowledge of all the details of his administration, of his understanding with General Diaz, who designated him as his successor, and with you who accepted him as your champion.

De la Barra's only redeeming grace was the self-abnegation with which he accepted an unusual position which was almost impossible to hold, and succeeded in maintaining that position at the head of the government until such time when he could turn the control of it over to his legitimate successor. I render homage to the honesty of his private and public life, to his patience, his perseverance, and to the intelligence he displayed in leaving the country as soon as he had relinquished the presidency.

I will now review the charges which have been brought against you.

You are first charged with disturbing the peace and starting a revolution. I have shown in my book, "The Rise and Fall of President Diaz,"* that there never lived a man great enough to start a revolution. The revolution was prepared by the government itself; but you were its spirit incarnate; you gave it life and blood. President Diaz prepared the revolution for you and forced upon you the role of an apostle, of a martyr, and of a leader.

We must never forget that it is overweening ambition, mismanagement, and acts of tyranny on the part of governments which give rise to revolutions and call its leaders into being.

The first charge, then, is unfounded, for you were not responsible for the revolution; but you are responsible for its consequences, first, as rebel leader; second, as president.

The second charge brought against you is that you entered into an agreement with the government immediately after the fall of Ciudad Juarez, instead of continuing the fight until the tyrant was overthrown. To me this proved only two things: Porfirio Diaz's intelligence, for his attitude on that occasion crowned him with a halo, more apparent than real, of patriotism, and saved his pride, since

* Published serially in the "Revista de Merida."

he assumed the part of a ruler who abdicates rather than that of a tyrant overthrown by force. It also was an evidence of sound judgment on your part, since the aim of the revolution was to eliminate Porfirio Diaz and his Camarilla; both being willing to step out, there was no justification for inflicting further losses on the country by sacrificing more human lives and spending more money.

Your accusers also say that you should have retired into private life as soon as the triumphs of the revolution, giving to the people unrestricted freedom in the choice of their representatives, had been assured. Such a rare and noble discretion would have marked you as a modest and disinterested man; it remains to be seen, however, whether it was opportune for you to assume that attitude, whether your associates in the revolution would have allowed you to assume it, and finally what might have come to pass if all the armed bands which had supported you had been left to shift for themselves without being held together by the personality of a leader recognized as the only and necessary one. To me this charge is futile and does not deserve to be even considered.

You are also charged with assuming immediate control of the government, conducting yourself as the actual ruler of the nation, using De la Barra as a patient dummy, and exerting

an autocratic power the more objectionable as it only aimed at promoting your own interests, and at insuring your election and the election of your protégés to the highest federal and state offices.

You are also accused of having delivered speeches of a subversive nature; of having closed your eyes to the murderous deeds perpetrated in Puebla and other cities; of having been too lenient to Zapata and other rebel chieftains whose troupes have become mere robber gangs. Some of your critics commenting on this last charge explain that you had to resort to this expedient to make your election sure, to hold in check De la Barra, whom you had begun to suspect, and to protect yourself against a possible hostile move of the federal army upon whose loyalty you felt you could not depend.

You are accused of having forced upon several of the States, for the purpose of insuring your victory at the polls, officials who were not popular with the people, and some of whom were greatly disliked; this caused much dissatisfaction and endangered the public peace. Among those unwelcome officials I shall mention in particular Pino Suarez, whom you first had elected Governor of the State of Yucatan and whom later you imposed on the Republic as vice-president; thus you repeated the faults

Diaz had committed, you caused divisions among the people, provoked the formation of new local and national factions, and furnished fuel to the opposition, all of which was the more unpardonable as it was unnecessary to insure your election. The support given you by your creatures added neither strength nor prestige to your cause.

Those were the principal charges made against you as presidential candidate. I now come to those made against you as president.

Your accusers say that after your election to the presidency you drove the nation to exasperation instead of quieting it; instead of reuniting your divided fellow citizens you made their differences more marked; instead of exterminating the brigand bands you allowed them to gain strength; instead of winning to your cause the discontented, you spurred them to more hostility and drove them into rebellion; instead of pacifying the country and of rallying around you all the scattered energies, you kept the country in a state of disorder and finally became a storm centre; your attitude has so complicated the affairs of the country that a foreign intervention has become imminent.

I am not justified in passing judgment upon those charges, for I have lived too far from the scene of your activities; besides, while they are

presented in a rather matter of fact manner, they are all very complex. Furthermore, those who formulated them were at too close range to have a clear vision, and may have been impelled by animus or personal interest. I do not dare to form a definite opinion of this case until more light has been thrown upon it.

What the majority of people contend, however, is that there is no justification for the present situation, for they feel that the opportunity was yours to establish on a firm basis a government which would have been respected by natives and foreigners alike. They say, indeed, that you could have united the country instead of dividing it, by calling into the ranks of your administration men of a conciliatory turn of mind who would have offered serious guarantees to all parties, thus nipping in the bud all germs of discord. To accomplish this you only had to avoid making General Reyes your bitter enemy and the leader of the discontented, and to avail yourself of the cooperation of Mr. de la Barra.

When you and Reyes concluded an agreement according to which both of you would run as presidential candidates, each preparing his own election in perfect freedom, the one who would be defeated pledging himself to support the administration of his fortunate rival, you made an auspicious beginning. Unfortunately

that pact was not respected. Your followers, animated by a pernicious fanaticism (fanaticism is always pernicious), directed ferocious attacks against General Reyes, they threatened and persecuted him and made attempts against his life; they treated his partisans as though they were outlaws, and made you two political adversaries and personal enemies. Reyes had to resign his commission in the army and to leave the country in order to protect his freedom and his life.

Mr. de la Barra was also subjected to all sorts of attacks at the hands of the Maderists who tried to ruin his prestige and to compromise him. They aroused your suspicions against him, and when his candidacy to the vice-presidency was announced, the fight directed against him in order to assure the triumph of Pino Suarez was so bitter that Mr. de la Barra decided to leave the capital the very day when he turned the power over to you, to exile himself under the pretext of accepting an official appointment, and to live abroad undisturbed.

If you had respected your pact with Reyes, I am sure you would have lost nothing and you would have gained a great deal. You would have stood high in the nation's esteem; your popularity would not have suffered in the least from such an act of generosity; nor would your success at the polls have been in any way less

assured; on the contrary, your triumph would have been more complete and more brilliant, for everyone would have been obliged to admit that your electoral campaign had been open and above suspicion, that you had respected legality, and that you had established the reign of democracy immediately after overthrowing tyranny.

You would not only have triumphed but carried away all the honors of a victory honestly won. Reyes and the Reyists would have had no cause for complaining of you or for attacking you. Reyes would have been compelled to abide by your agreement; and, for personal reasons, would have been as faithful an ally of the new president as he had been of Porfirio Diaz. No one would have objected to your calling him to your side as your minister of war, and everybody would have appreciated the magnanimity of such an act. This would have greatly increased your prestige. Reyes defeated by you at the polls and then exalted by your administration would have brought to you the support of the military element and of a well organized party.

De la Barra as vice-president would have proved a pacifying, conciliatory factor, a guarantee to the representatives of conservatism. It would have established a diplomatic bond

with the foreign powers, with the United States in particular.

By calling General Reyes to your side you would have shown magnanimity; by keeping Mr. de la Barra in Mexico you would have shown gratitude; in both cases you would have shown yourself a clever statesman. Those two men standing at your side as your main collaborators would have symbolized PEACE and HARMONY.

Both would have undoubtedly endeavored to succeed you in the presidential chair at the expiration of your term and, consequently, two powerful parties would have cropped up under their leadership; the Maderist party would have continued, however, to support you as long as you remained in power. All this would have meant in the end more stability and a smoother course for your administration. The two men would have paid particular attention to the discharge of their duties and promoted peace and prosperity for the sake of gaining greater popularity.

As both of them would have been under your orders their following would have been unquestionably, and without their being aware of it, in your control; and you would have been, in the last analysis, the only true leader.

If either of them had shown himself restive or disloyal it could not have constituted a great

danger for your administration; having him practically under your thumb you could have crushed him easily and held him up to the public scorn.

You failed to see that, and you let the wonderful opportunity pass by; instead of the boon which we expected, we are facing the calamity we feared. The present situation, however optimistic one may be, can only appear as chaotic, desperate, and, perhaps, a hopeless one.

I would sum it up as follows: We have in Mexico a government which has failed thus far to establish itself firmly, shaken as it is by the machinations of anarchistic factions which cannot be held in check for lack of the proper machinery. I may add that the foreign nations regard us with diffidence if not with disgust; an intervention is becoming more and more the logical possibility, and will soon become a fact if we do not apply the proper remedy in time. The time to apply that remedy is now.

Some say that the press unrestrained by any censorship, is to a great extent responsible for this deplorable state of affairs, and that the government has only one choice: either to suppress the liberty of the press, which would be suicidal, or to tolerate its present attitude, the consequences of which will be fatal to the government. The truth is that the government

has never faced such an alternative. The suppression of the liberty of the press did not prevent the fall of President Diaz. A government does not succumb to the attacks of the press unless those attacks are justified by the government's deeds. When attacks by the press are unfounded they are of no consequence and even defeat their own purpose. Slander may prove effective, but only for a short time, and when the first effect has worn off, truth shines brighter than ever.

Is there a way out of this difficulty? There must be one. Every political and social problem has its solution. Our first duty, however, is to determine where the remedy can be best applied. Many a ruler trying to solve the problem has considered that problem not from the nation's point of view but from his own, and has endeavored to solve it in a manner favorable not to the welfare of the public but to his own private interests. The nation's and the ruler's interest are not always identical, but in the present case I consider that they could have been easily reconciled.

To imagine for a minute that the problem could be solved by starting a new revolution, or as some call it wrongly a counter-revolution, would be the height of absurdity. A new revolution would only complicate the difficulties and

bring about a consummation to be most feared: foreign intervention.

What then is to be done? Let us consult our reason, our common sense: If whatever has been done to this day has proved disastrous, let us follow the opposite course and we may expect gratifying results.

Any attempt to establish an autocracy at this stage of the game, regardless of whatever name it might bear, would be a mistake. The idea of a family oligarchy would be absurd. To allow the rabble to assume the power would be a crime. To suppose that one mere magic formula can make democracy emerge triumphantly from this chaos would be to reveal a deplorable ignorance of the philosophy of history. Democracy is not a beginning but an end. In no country in the world has democracy, at the present day, more than a wished for possibility. Nowhere has it become a fact. Democracy will be and is beginning to be the result of a slow evolution, not of violent revolution.

At this historical stage of our development, the most crucial that our country has reached, our first duty is to bring order out of this chaos. This is not the time to better a few details, but to create a whole system anew. The only system that can save us is that which was introduced by the constitution of 1857. The only political motive likely to bring about the de-

sired results is pure patriotism. The secret of our salvation is contained in two words: Constitution and patriotism.

The first step should be the establishment of peace. Order and morality will be the fundamental principles which will lead to an era of confidence and prosperity. Finally the gradual application of democratic principles will enable us to perfect our great work.

Under the exceptional circumstances obtaining at the present day, can the efforts of one single man, however gifted he may be, bring forth the longed for results? I answer emphatically: no.

Can those results be brought forth by the efforts of only one of the parties into which our nation finds itself divided? I answer again: no.

How then can those results be attained? By reuniting all the sane elements which are today being separated by a wider and wider chasm. I call sane elements all those which are not tainted with brigandage or crime.

What is imperative at the present day is not to attempt a conciliation of the various parties, but, frankly speaking, to conclude a transaction with them; efforts made in common and responsibilities incurred in common will gradually instill in the minds a powerful spirit of solidarity.

You must bear in mind that to make con-

cessions does not necessarily mean to yield, and that to yield does not necessarily mean to be defeated.

You must also bear in mind that political skill precludes a stubborn disposition and presupposes the capacity to adapt oneself to circumstances. When circumstances are too mighty to be overcome we must submit to them, but only as a good pilot submits to the irresistible force of a current, though taking good care, until she reaches less dangerous waters where she can be easily steered, that the ship does not lose her rudder, nor become grounded on sand banks, or wrecked against rocks.

No one can deny that you are in all legality the constitutional president of the United States of Mexico, for no one can deny that elections were held, that the people cast their votes, and that you were elected by an overwhelming majority; the fact that either fear or caution or other motives kept other candidates from running against you is not sufficient to invalidate your election. It is an obvious, concrete, and incontrovertible fact that you are the constitutional president *de facto* and *de jure*, and that you shall be recognized as such in Mexico and abroad. Your government as far as its legal basis is concerned is above criticism; so much more so as according to modern legal

conceptions the only lawful governments are governments de facto.

The legality with which you are invested, however, the book you published on presidential problems and to which you owe your first fame, the San Luis manifesto which you issued when you assumed the leadership of the revolution, the proclamations and speeches you delivered when you were a candidate for the presidency, the solemn oath you took when you came into office, to respect and to make people respect the Mexican constitution with its by-laws and amendments, with the laws of reform and their corollaries, to discharge faithfully the duties of the office of president with which the nation had entrusted you for the welfare and prosperity of the union; all these burden you with a great, with an enormous responsibility in your own eyes and the eyes of the whole nation.

Can you afford, in view of such historical antecedents, after making such solemn promises and after assuming such sacred duties towards the nation, to repeat the mistakes of the past administration? Will you violate the constitution and allow it to be violated, persecute the press, order arrests without warrant, executions without trial?

How can you, after starting a revolution and overthrowing a government which, we must not

forget it, was a government *de facto* and *de jure*, treat as bandits and outlaws those who rise in arms against you, availing themselves of a right of which you availed yourself and resorting to the very tactics which enabled you to gain your present position? How can you muzzle the press when it resorts to the tactics to which you resorted when you started the revolution and when you went on your presidential campaign tour attacking savagely your political opponents and their supporters?

Are you not courting the charge of using a double standard? Are you not showing a regrettable lack of constancy? Are you not laying destructive hands upon your own work?

There are only two solutions to the present situation. You can either conclude the transaction I suggested, or, if you cannot govern according to the constitution and with the support of the nation, resign. Otherwise you will gradually become unpopular and be swept away by an insurrection; and in your fall you will drag the country to destruction.

My services are at the command of the government as long as the interests of our country are being safeguarded; if the government, however, enters upon the wrong path, I shall feel compelled to withdraw my assistance in order to continue my work for the cause of the country, which to me is the most sacred cause.

Do not attribute to vanity and presumption the attitude I assume. Far be it from me to think that I am of any weight in the political scales or can impose any conditions. My only motive in writing you this long letter is a desire to express to you my good will towards your government, pointing out the hidden obstacles against which it might wreck itself, and disclosing the reasons which might eventually compel me to separate myself from you and to carry on the struggle for the realization of my ideals, perhaps without affiliating myself with any party, a voluntary exile once more as I was during the last four years of President Diaz's administration; for I am always ready to sacrifice my own conveniences when the interests of my country are at stake.

I do not know whether you will have the time and the patience necessary to peruse this long letter, or whether, having read it, you will give it any consideration; but that does not matter to me. I feel that I have performed my duty: as your friend, by telling you the truth and showing you the dangers that beset your path; as a citizen, by trying to save our country from the terrible danger of a foreign intervention, for which history would blame the irresponsible actions of the people and the conscienceless attitude of the government.

I remain your sincere friend, who wishes you the best success, for your own good and for the good of the country,

RAFAEL DE LA ZAYAS ENRIQUEZ.



FRANCISCO I. MADERO

CHAPTER II

MADERO THE IRRESPONSIBLE—A STRIKING CONTRAST BETWEEN MADERO AND PORFIRIO DIAZ—MADERO'S ADMINISTRATION—THE MANIFESTO OF GENERAL FELIX DIAZ.

Many considered Francisco I. Madero a criminal character. In my opinion he was merely an irresponsible individual lacking in balance, harmless as long as he remained in the obscurity of private life; dangerous, however, when he took an active part in politics, and positively harmful when he assumed control of the government. He personally did little harm, but he allowed others to do an appalling amount.

In his egotism he imagined himself to be an apostle, a prophet, a heroic warrior and a social redeemer, although he lacked the ability to perfect any plans, to establish a system, to fight a battle, to govern a country, even to carry out orders.

Every one of his acts furnished ample proof of his incompetence.

On countless occasions the press and the insurgents charged him with breaking the solemn engagements he had taken before the revolution of 1910 and after its triumph to establish a democratic régime in Mexico. That charge was absolutely unfounded as I shall prove by quotations from the San Luis manifesto, his revolutionary programme and platform, from his addresses and messages, and from the after-dinner speeches he delivered after his party came into power.

A perusal of those documents reveals a notable consistency between his words and his deeds; those who pretend that Madero failed to come up to their expectations reveal merely their lack of information and understanding.

If we read carefully the San Luis manifesto we will see that it can not in any way be considered as emanating from a political party, nor even from a small group of individuals, and that it is in no wise national in character. It is simply a

personal document, an extremely personal one in which the I's play a prominent part, "we" being used very seldom and only when Madero refers to Francisco Vasquez Gomez. Excerpts like the following will illustrate my point:

"Following the wise custom which obtains in republican countries I visited various parts of this republic, and appealed to *my* fellow citizens. Every one of *my* speaking tours *was truly a triumphal march*. . . . The day came at last when General Diaz realized the actual situation of the republic and understood that he could no longer combat *me* with any chance of success in the arena of democracy, and he gave orders to arrest *me*."

"*I* realize that if the people have selected *me* as candidate for the presidency, it is because they have found in *me* not so much the qualities that constitute a statesman or an organizer but the *virility of a patriot*, ready to sacrifice himself. . . . When *I* threw myself into the fight for democracy *I* knew well that

General Diaz would never respect the expressed wishes of the people; when the noble Mexican nation supported *me* at the polls it knew very well also what outrages it would have to expect. . . .”

“Besides the attitude of the population before, during, and after the elections revealed a violent opposition to General Diaz’s government and proved that if the elections had been held fairly *I* would have been elected president of the republic. On the strength of which, *constituting myself* the mouthpiece of the nation’s will, *I hereby declare* the last election illegal, and the Republic finding itself consequently without a legitimate government, *I assume* the provisional presidency of the Republic.”

“*I declare* in all honor that *I* would consider it as a weakness on my part and as treason to the nation which has accorded *me* its confidence not to place myself at the head of my fellow citizens *who are calling upon me anxiously from every part of the country* to compel General

Diaz by the force of arms to respect the nation's wishes."

The foregoing is amply sufficient to give an idea of the San Luis Manifesto and to reveal Madero's psychology. Pompous, vain, arrogant phraseology, in which the first person recurs constantly; misrepresentations and exaggerations. That a *part* of the population designated Madero for the presidency is true, but to say that the population, or even the majority of the population did so, is a gratuitous falsehood. Madero could truthfully state that the people of Mexico had had no opportunity to discover his gifts as a statesman; but neither had it had a chance to judge his virile patriotism. The Mexican nation never supported him personally at the polls nor during the revolution. The Mexican people never called upon him (let us pass by the word "anxiously") to head the revolt. The truth is that it wasn't Madero who started or even headed the revolution, but Pascual Orozco, Jr. and Pascual Orozco, Sr. in the North, and the brothers Zapata in

the South; to be perfectly accurate I must say that the first revolutionary move was made by Aquiles Serdan of Puebla, who was not acting in concert with Madero any more than the Zapatas were at first.

In all the addresses and after-dinner speeches which Madero delivered after the revolution, when he was a candidate for the presidency, he showed himself a mere demagogue, promising to the people whatever he happened to think of, without waiting to be asked for it, and as though he were absolute master of everybody's life and property; he corrupted the army by bribery, alienating the good will of the commanding officers; in an address to the inmates of the Monterey Penitentiary he went so far as to say that many people were at large who deserved to be imprisoned much more than they.

He never carried favor with the nation itself but with the lowest and roughest populace whose coarse instincts he aroused, with the bandits serving sentences in prisons, promising to them a government by the olocracy, the domination of the

lower classes to the detriment of the others.

It is a fact that in crises and periods of disorder, vice and virtue run to extremes, and human nature reveals itself in its highest and its lowest, particularly in its lowest, aspects. In 1910, a year of crises and disorder, Madero revealed the powers for evil that lay in him; egotism, megalomania, hankering for popular applause; among the roughest element of the population there flamed up all the evil instincts which had been kept down for thirty years by the iron hand of President Diaz; it was the populace, not the honest working class population which howled, "Our day has come," and insulted by words, gestures and even by deeds of violence the most respected women in Mexican society.

These happenings were not the result of Madero's machinations; his ill-balanced mind could not cope with the newly created situation; therein we find the most convincing proof of his irresponsible character.

Madero was not born to be a leader. Superficial in his judgments, stubborn in his capriciousness, fettered by many superstitions, he was not what is called a personality, he was merely an abnormal type.

He trusted his luck; and all his partisans always harped on his luck, which they considered as infallible. Madero and his followers knew nothing of logic, of the relation between cause and effect, the basis of all events, the fundamental principle of the universe.

Attempts have been made to establish a parallel between President Madero and President Porfirio Diaz. While we observe between the two a striking contrast we fail to discover any point of resemblance.

If I go into such details it is not for the sake of making this book more readable but in order to visualize better for my readers the personality of Madero. An understanding of his psychology furnishes a key to the causes of the revolution which overthrew him. Besides I consider

biographical information as one of the most important elements of history.

When I state that there is absolutely no possible comparison between the two men, I should not be suspected of any partisan bias, for I broke openly with the Porfirists some seven years ago.

One could not find two personalities more unlike than those of the last two presidents of Mexico.

Porfirio Diaz came from a poor family and received all his training in his struggle for existence and on the battlefield, gaining quite a reputation as a soldier before he rose to the presidency.

Francisco I. Madero was born to wealth, spent his life among the business men and merchants who composed his family circle, and was elevated to the highest position in the republic by unforeseen events.

Porfirio Diaz brought to the presidency the vast knowledge of men and of conditions he had acquired during his career as a soldier, administrator of large districts, politician and insurgent leader.

Madero was an improvised politician, an improvised revolutionist, and an improvised president, lacking entirely not only in practical but even in theoretical knowledge of warfare, politics and administration, unacquainted even with his associates and with the conditions of the country.

Diaz is a man of courage, with the quiet and conscious bravery of one who knows danger and who instead of rushing into it blindly, meets it and measures it coolly, and then devises ways of overcoming it.

Madero displayed the blind and unreasoning daring of the irresponsible. He rushed headlong like a projectile, caring little where he was to land or what the effects of his action would be.

Porfirio Diaz can hold his tongue. He only speaks when he has something to say, and then he says exactly what he has made up his mind to say, not a word more, not a word less.

Madero never knew the value of discretion and suffered from an incurable loquacity; he would speak of everything and everybody; little he knew, when he

rose to speak, what he was to speak about; he became intoxicated with the sound of his own voice, going always farther than he should have gone, and revealing many things he should have kept to himself.

Diaz hardly ever spoke of himself, and when he was compelled to do so used "we" instead of "I."

Madero never spoke except in the first person singular. He was the everlasting I.

Diaz only informed the public of his notable actions and valuable accomplishments and left his own personality in the shadow, knowing well that the public and his adulators could be relied upon to throw it into relief and to exaggerate his personal traits.

Madero made extraordinary efforts to become the center of interest, a unique personage, the cynosure of all eyes, as though he suspected that in no other way could a man of his small stature command any attention. Madero was a small figure, physically and intellectually.

Diaz assumed the power with one am-

bition in his heart: to make himself great by adding to his country's greatness.

Madero had one pet ambition and also certain definite plans. It was his ambition to witness his own apotheosis. It is said that his plans were mainly to stave off the ruin of his family then heavily involved. This was at least generally admitted.

Plutarch would not have devoted a chapter to Diaz's life, but Diaz would have fitted into Machiavelli's Prince.

Madero remained in spite of his tragic end a Molièresque personage. His life was a gruesome farce, ending with a catastrophe.

Porfirio Diaz sacrificed many victims in order to establish and maintain a political system that would insure peace. A Warsovian peace it was called by many men of unbiased minds, an educational peace, Diaz called it, for he considered it as the only means of training his fellow citizens for a life of order and labor.

Madero took as many lives as Diaz did, or perhaps more, in a shorter period of

time; he inaugurated an era of terrorism, not for political reasons, not for educational purposes, but in order to achieve his personal ends and to further the interests of his family.

Porfirio Diaz filled the national treasury with a surplus of several millions; Madero left it considerably depleted.

Diaz established the credit of the nation on a firm basis; he himself made use of that credit for illegitimate ends at times. The many loans he negotiated through his minister Limantour enriched considerably the members of the so-called Scientific Party headed by Limantour himself. It cannot be denied, however, that those loans enabled him to finance and carry out large enterprises of national utility.

Madero also floated many loans from which, however, the country never derived any benefit; it was said that they were issued in order to organize a large standing army; but the army was never organized, Madero failed to preserve order in Mexico and to put an end to the anarchistic con-

ditions which became intolerable during his funest term of administration.

Diaz manufactured out of whole cloth legends likely to win popularity for his protégés. Madero was always busy manufacturing alleged plots which his police always nipped in the bud; comic opera conspiracies to kidnap him, to overthrow him, to assassinate him; when at last one real conspiracy was formed, neither he nor his police had wind of it until the revolution was well on its way.

The chief difference between the two men, however, was the fact that Porfirio Diaz always acted after due deliberation, while Madero acted upon impulse.

Porfirio Diaz had a genius for meeting emergencies. Madero was a mere amateur without any talent for any definite kind of work.

At the time of his fall Porfirio Diaz predicted that Madero could not rule Mexico unless he adhered to the methods he had established. The old warrior forgot that it requires an Alexander to tame a Bucephalus.

* * *

We give our sympathy to revolutionists or withhold it according to the cause they champion, but the results of a revolution alone justify it or condemn it.

When Madero rose up in arms, he enlisted the sympathies of all, because he voiced the people's desire to end the unusual term of office of President Diaz and especially of the men who constituted the power behind the throne, the "Scientific Group". The sympathies, however, went to the revolution itself, not to its leader. When the battle was won, the nation repeating the traditional mistake of nations relapsed into personalism, worshipped the victor and marveled at the ease with which he had triumphed.

Here begins the second act of the drama. Madero assumed the control of the government, not as some pretend, through election frauds, although he resorted, before the elections, to a good deal of violence and to more or less justifiable intrigues. By threats and intimidations he compelled Congress to advance the date of the elections; he persecuted other candi-

dates who were to enter the presidential contest independently. He forced upon the States functionaries, who were not only his partisans but his avowed accomplices. He imposed upon the nation Pino Suarez as candidate for the vice presidency. On election day there was no candidacy possible besides his own. I am positive that if he had refrained from such untoward actions, if he had given the public absolute freedom, he would have carried the election just the same. His attitude on that occasion harmed him much more than it helped him.

The nation then found itself in great suspense. No man with a spark of common sense ever expected Madero to fulfil even one half of the promises he had made as revolutionary leader or as presidential candidate; it would have been beyond the limits of the possible. But he was expected to inaugurate at least a regime of order and justice. Madero unfortunately was himself caught in the snares he had set. He failed to surround himself with men of integrity and of

proved patriotism; he refused to listen to advice; he remained the leader of a clique instead of becoming the leader of a nation; he gave a free hand in the conduct of governmental affairs to a coterie which proved more predatory than even the Scientific Group. It is now a recognized fact that his administration meant disaster for Mexico from every point of view, political, administrative and international.

The Madero revolution was not a revolution but rather a scandal and a calamity; it found no justification in its results and therefore sentence was passed upon it without appeal.

The whole country began anew to manifest its unrest. Revolutionary groups sprang up in the Northern, in the Southern, and in the Central States; they lacked coherence and leaders of prestige; the same desire, however, animated them all. They were all bent on overthrowing Madero.

In the few months during which Madero remained at the head of the administration, that is from July 1, 1912, to Feb-

ruary, 1913, he squandered (besides the current receipts and the seventy and some odd million pesos President Diaz had left in the treasury when he relinquished the presidency) \$35,000,000 more than the budget called for.

Before the fiscal year 1910-1911 the liability account of the nation amounted to from \$300,000 to \$400,000. In that year, on the other hand, that amount was doubled (exactly \$995,521.78), and on June 30, 1912, it had jumped up to \$19,001.951.34.

Where had all those millions gone to? To this day that mystery has not been unraveled.

After Madero's fall the provisional government disposed of only the \$189,098.33 in cash left in the treasury and of \$874,524.48 deposited by the Treasury with the National Bank.

Carlos Toro in his essay on "The Overthrowing of Madero by the Diaz Revolt" summarizes as follows the conditions obtaining at the very time when the Diaz revolt was on the point of breaking out.

“At the beginning of the current year (1913) the (Maderist) party was utterly discredited. Many positive charges have been made against it: It had, its enemies said, organized and was supporting the Porra.*

“It recruited into its ranks all the incapables of the nation; it displayed an intolerant if not terroristic attitude towards its opponents; it ignored the excesses and indecent practices of government officials in their private life; it persecuted the press; it allowed men in authority to commit assassination without process of law; it permitted the daily slaughter of Mexicans under the pretext that they were revolutionists; it demoralized the army by allowing jail birds, freed illegally, to enlist. Other charges brought against it were: failure to comply with the extraordinary promises made to the working class; the shady, dishonest deals closed with United States capitalists; the doubtful origin of the funds with which Madero

* A clique led by Gustavo Madero, the president's brother, which committed many acts of violence.

financed his revolution; the considerable sums* taken from the public treasury and lent to the president's brother (Gustavo Madero) without collateral; the influence that adventurers and other unconscionable characters had upon the president; the mysterious vitality of the Zapatist revolt; the unspeakable deals of Gustavo Madero; the police persecution of independent citizens; the framed-up conspiracy cases which excused the jailing of harmless persons; the insults offered to respectably constituted bodies; the direct appointment by the government of officials who should have been selected by regular election; the obstinacy with which the party supported secretaries of state repudiated by public opinion; the insolence of the government organs; the clubbing or stoning of people who were not on friendly terms with the government, and the fires that had broken out in their houses; the feasts and entertainments coinciding with the most painful scenes of

* Estimated at \$700,000.

national grief; the orgies indulged in by certain "Renovators"* in public places of amusement; finally the scandalous dismantling of Salina Cruz, considered by everybody as the first step towards a criminal act of treason.

"So many causes of irritation kept the nation in a state of mind similar to that of a patient who, realizing that the amputation of a limb has become imperative, cannot, however, resign himself to the operation and tries to soothe the pain that is torturing him by the use of drugs and opiates.

"While Madero was talking himself hoarse about legality, the nation as a whole, and even Madero's worst enemies had made up their minds to respect legality to the utmost limit, so as not to establish in Mexican history the detestable precedent of a president regularly elected being overthrown by violence. This is the reason why the revolts of Pascual Orozco and of General Bernardo Reyes were not successful; this is why the country toler-

* An opprobrious epithet applied to Madero's supporters.

ated in silence the ineptitudes of its president, the violence and the unbridled license of his henchmen. If Madero had not prepared his own downfall, this consummation, both desired and feared, would not have been brought about."

The truth is that the nation gave no support to its government because it had no confidence in that government and resented its shocking machinations; neither did the nation support the revolutionists because it failed to find among them one striking personality offering positive guarantees for the future.

On October 16, 1912, General Felix Diaz, followed by a part of the Federal garrison, headed an insurrectional movement in the city of Vera Cruz, the main port of the Mexican Republic. He intended to pacify the country with the help of justice, and he directed to the army the following manifesto:

"Noble army to which it has been my honored privilege to belong since the days of my youth and from which it is now my painful duty to separate myself as a

violent protest against the necessity placed upon us of recognizing as our equals, and even our superiors, criminals rescued from the steps of the scaffold, foreign adventurers or mere relatives of our ruler. My comrades, and especially you, my brothers, the alumni of the glorious Military College, I appeal to you. As I said expressly before the supreme authorities which governed our country on August 21, 1909, in the address I delivered on the occasion of the closing exercises of our association, discipline ends when the supreme interest of the country begins; the sword which the nation has given you to be used in its defense has been transformed by the present government into a hangman's axe by means of which it is trying to impose its tyranny. I call upon you to join hands with us in carrying out the work of justice."

The revolt of General Diaz awoke many sympathies among the Mexican population and even in foreign countries. Pleasant hopes were built upon its possible success. Unfortunately its young leader,

rich in valor and self-confidence, was lacking in experience and in organizing ability. He was betrayed and captured by the Maderist troops which had promised him their assistance and had entered Vera Cruz waving white flags and acclaiming Felix Diaz. The officers involved in this incident have not been able to deny nor to explain that stratagem satisfactorily.

Madero ordered that Felix Diaz be tried by a court-martial extraordinary before which the rebel leader declared that he alone was guilty and that he assumed the entire responsibility for the revolt. The court-martial sentenced him to death, but the execution did not take place, as the attorneys for the defendant appealed to the Federal Supreme Court, which suspended the sentence.

Efforts have been made to create the impression that Felix Diaz had escaped with his life thanks to Madero's clemency. There is no evidence to that effect.

Members of the Porra, of which Gustavo Madero was the leader, did everything in their power to bring about the

execution of Felix Diaz; they organized a popular demonstration in which the scum of the city, the lowest slum rabble, took part, carrying posters with sanguinary mottoes and howling at the top of their voices for the head of Felix Diaz.

A committee of the leading women of Mexico City and a committee of newspapermen called upon President Madero petitioning him to spare the life of his unfortunate adversary; the only answer they received was to the effect that Madero had made up his mind to put Diaz to death, for such was the will of the people. That he did not proceed with the execution was due only to the energetic attitude of the Supreme Court, whose decree he did not dare to disregard.

Felix Diaz was at first held in the prison of San Juan de Ulúa, then transferred to the capital and committed to the penitentiary. At that time General Bernardo Reyes was also in Mexico City, an inmate of the military prison of Santiago Tlaltelolco.

CHAPTER III

to the soldiers to fire. He was not allowed to write his will nor to send a line of farewell to his family.

“That act assumed all the features of an atrocious political assassination for which Madero and the four ministers mentioned above will be held responsible by history. The law of suspension of guarantees could not be applied in the Federal district, and General Ruiz should have been tried by a competent court with full knowledge of his case.” (Op. cit.)

We may add that General Ruiz, being a representative to the National Congress, enjoyed thereby legislative immunity and could not stand trial unless the House of which he was a member had impeached him.



GENERAL BERNARDO REYES

Vera Cruz chieftain, but they continued their preparations in secret.

One of the rebel groups was ready for action at the beginning of December, 1912. It was officered by Generals Bernardo Reyes and Gregorio Ruiz, by Captains Romero Lopez, Tapia y Mendoza, the corps of cadets, and Colonel Zozaya, warden of the military prison, and it comprised among other civil personalities Dr. Espinosa de los Monteros and Rafael de Zayas, of the Reyes party, Juan Palacios and Francisco de P. Senties, of the Vasquez party, Miguel Mendizábal, formerly associated with Zapata, Pedro Duhart, a follower of Mondragon, Mayor Solache, partisan of Diaz, and S. Savinón, independent anti-Maderist.

It was necessary to select a chief who would conduct the military operations, and all the unanimous choice of the rebels fell upon General Victoriano Huerta, who had recently returned to Mexico City after winning much commendation for the campaign conducted by

the Northern army division which was under his orders.

Instead of showing gratitude to General Huerta for the immense service he had rendered to Madero by holding in check, driving away, and finally annihilating Orozco's bands which had been advancing victoriously towards the heart of Mexico, the Maderists fought the victorious veteran in an underhand way, in order to offset his increasing popularity. The official organs did not hesitate to fling insults in his face, and the government even began to persecute him.

When General Huerta, suffering from severe eye trouble, went to Dr. Aureliano Urrutia's sanatorium to be operated upon, the Maderists left him in peace for a while. In his retreat, however, he received many calls from Joaquín Claussell, a young lawyer, a brilliant and resolute man and a good friend of Dr. Urrutia, and from Fernando Gil, a man of distinguished intellect and of sound judgment, an old partisan of Reyes and related through his wife's family to General Huerta. These

two men assumed the task of preparing the hero of the Northern campaign to accept the leadership of the projected insurrection; but they could not make him break his allegiance to the government.

General Manuel Mondragón had also organized a group of officers and citizens, among whom were Rodolfo Reyes, General Reyes's son, and Cecilio L. Ocón, a daring young man who was the heart and soul of the Felix Diaz revolt, and who negotiated with the group mentioned previously for a joint action which was likely to be more successful. The alliance was concluded on the understanding that General Reyes and Felix Diaz would be the leaders of the revolt, that the former would be commander-in-chief, assume the provisional presidency with the attributes of a military dictator, and issue a call for presidential elections, after which all would do their best to assure the election of Felix Diaz.

Those plans were made quite openly; but the government, carried away by its optimism, paid no attention to them, and

never modified its attitude. To those who warned him Madero answered invariably: "Nobody can down me; I represent legality."

The army was incensed over Madero's ill-disguised contempt for it. The president was busy levying corps after corps of rurales with a view to making them his main support, thus gaining the upper hand over the regular troops, which he would disband whenever possible. He created the ranks of honorary colonels and honorary brigadier-generals, and conferred them indiscriminately upon men who had never served in the regular army, for instance upon General Francisco Villa, a well known brigand chief. Francisco Villa had been placed under arrest by General Huerta during the Northern campaign for grave insubordination and sent to the capital to be court-martialed. Madero sent him to the penitentiary, where he was treated with every possible regard; after a short period of detention he received some funds from Madero, who allowed him to escape. Thereupon the

minister of war and the president telephoned to General Huerta, telling him of Villa's escape and advising him to be on his guard, as Villa had sworn he would kill him. Huerta answered coolly that he was thankful for the warning, but that such advice was quite superfluous.

The date of the revolt was changed several times; several times orders were given and then withdrawn; this caused much friction between the organizers of the rebellion, for everything was in readiness, and delay alone was dangerous.

On Saturday, February 8, 1913, everything was ready, and it was decided to take action the following day. General Mondragon was in favor of waiting until the 10th. Only it was discovered that one of the officers admitted into the conspiracy had betrayed his associates to Gustavo Madero, and that the rebels would be arrested that night and shot on the spot. After a long discussion General Mondragon decided to strike the blow on Sunday morning.

Following the plan agreed upon, the

cadets of the military preparatory school of Tlalpam, a town near Mexico City, started out at 5 A. M. and reached the station of the electric railway, which they found deserted. It was arranged then that the section of cavalry should hasten towards San Antonio Abad, one of the gateways of Mexico City. There they were to wait for the rest of the column, which marched upon the Huipulco station, and commanded trains to carry it to the rendezvous; the column reformed itself and marched upon the national palace, which it occupied without encountering any resistance. Preparations were also made to occupy the towers of the cathedrals, and a detachment of cavalry rode off towards the Santiago Tlaltelolco jail to assist in liberating General Reyes.

General Mondragon and Gregorio Ruiz, commanding another column which comprised the 1st cavalry and sections of the 2nd and 5th artillery with their cannon, left their quarters in Tacubaya bound for Mexico City via Chapultepec,

where President Madero was at the time. When they passed Libertad Street they were joined by sections of the 1st artillery stationed there. They reached the military prison, where they found mounted cadets and men from the 20th infantry commanded by General Reyes, who had been freed without difficulty.

The revolutionary corps then proceeded towards the penitentiary, from which they delivered Brigadier-General Felix Diaz without any bloodshed; some time was consumed, however, in parleying with the warden, who yielded only when the rebels threatened to shell the prison.

General Reyes and Diaz embraced each other cordially and took command of the rebels, cheered loudly by the soldiers and by the crowds which had been amassing.

The column in battle formation made for the national palace, but met with a bitter disappointment when approaching the building.

The first person to hear of the uprising was Gustavo Madero, who, accompanied by several friends, hastened towards the

palace in an automobile. No sooner had he arrived there than he found himself a prisoner in the hands of the cadets who a short while before had captured General Angel Garcia Pena, minister of war.

General Lauro Villar, military commander of Mexico City, was informed of the disturbance directly after the surrender of the palace. He went to the palace, apostrophized the guard valiantly, persuaded it to obey his orders, and took as his prisoners the cadets who didn't dare to shoot at the heroic veteran. He at once organized the defense of the palace.

A few minutes later General Gregorio Ruiz, preceding General Reyes's column, appeared at the head of two squadrons of cavalry ready to lend assistance to the cadets. General Villar accompanied by Messrs. Baso and Salazar, first and second superintendents of the palace, met general Ruiz and ordered him to surrender, while the two other men leveled their guns point-blank at the breast of the rebel chief, who, unable to resist, complied with the order.

Generals Reyes and Diaz advanced then at the head of their columns in total ignorance of what had just taken place. General Manuel M. Velasquez went to tell them that the palace had been retaken by the government, and advised them to change their plans accordingly. General Reyes, always haughty and ready to play his all on one card, disregarded that judicious advice and advanced against the troops defending the position. General Villar stopped him, ordering him to surrender, and General Reyes, according to the accepted version of the incident, fired at him. This fact, however, is denied by several witnesses to the incident. One positive fact is that some one shot at General Reyes, who fell dead with a bullet through his skull. At the same time the forces within the palace opened a brisk fire with rifles and machine guns, mowing down the assailants and a mob of men, women and children, who, attracted by their curiosity, were crowding the large square in front of the palace. The number of innocent bystanders thus

killed was over eight hundred, while fully as many more were injured.

This untoward development demoralized for a while the rebel column. Generals Diaz and Mondragon held a brief conference; they decided not to train their artillery on the palace on account of the terrible damage it would inflict upon the city; they retreated towards the Agricultural School, then, changing their minds while on their way there, finally marched on the Citadel, where they could secure a large supply of arms and ammunition.

The troops occupying the Citadel resisted for twenty minutes, but capitulated at one o'clock in the afternoon. When the rebel forces, which we will henceforth designate as the Felixists, made their triumphal entrance several officers were taken prisoners; among them was General Dávila, a member of the court-martial extraordinary which had sentenced General Felix Diaz to death. Dávila unbuckled his sword and offered it to General Diaz, who said to him:

"Keep your sword, comrade. I shall grasp with much pleasure the hand that signed my death sentence in Vera Cruz."

And he actually shook hands with him and spared his life as well as that of the other prisoners.

* * *

President Madero was informed by telephone of the happenings in the capital, and a little after 7 A. M. left the Castle of Chapultepec. On his way to the national palace he rode a white horse and was escorted by a group of cadets of the Military College and a few Chapultepec foresters. He was serene and smiling, and, as was his custom, greeted with a great display of cordiality every one he met. His escort prevailed upon him to stop and take refuge in a photographer's studio opposite the National Theatre while they would find out what was happening. He was met there by several members of his family, some of his ministers and General Victoriano Huerta.

A little later it was decided to resume

the march towards the palace, and the president, with his everlasting smile on his lips, rode through the large square over the victims of the savage butchery ordered by one of his officers.

“On his arrival at the national palace,” writes José Fernandez Rojas in his “Mexican Revolution,” “Madero was apprised by General Villar of the situation; a cabinet council was held at once in which only Hernandez, Ernesto Madero, General Angel Garcia Pena, and the engineer Manuel Bonilla took part. It issued the following orders:

“1. That General Gregorio Ruiz be put to death at once without trial.

“2. That the legislature be directed to extend the powers of the executive over the finance and war departments.

“3. That General Victoriano Huerta be made military commander of the capital. (General Villar had been wounded.)

“Those orders were carried out at once and General Ruiz was shot in the yard of the palace, displaying to the end marvellous courage and himself giving the order

to the soldiers to fire. He was not allowed to write his will nor to send a line of farewell to his family.

“That act assumed all the features of an atrocious political assassination for which Madero and the four ministers mentioned above will be held responsible by history. The law of suspension of guarantees could not be applied in the Federal district, and General Ruiz should have been tried by a competent court with full knowledge of his case.” (Op. cit.)

We may add that General Ruiz, being a representative to the National Congress, enjoyed thereby legislative immunity and could not stand trial unless the House of which he was a member had impeached him.

With him several of the young cadets made prisoners in the palace were also shot to death.

It is imperative to bear all these facts in mind in order to pass an impartial judgment upon the administration of President Francisco I. Madero.

CHAPTER IV

CONTINUATION OF THE BLOODY TEN DAYS—
THE OPTIMISTIC AND IRRESPONSIBLE
MADERO — THE DIPLOMATIC CORPS —
THE MISSION OF THE SENATE—GEN-
ERAL VICTORIANO HUERTA—THE DI-
LEMMA IN WHICH HE FOUND HIMSELF
—THE DECISION TAKEN BY GENERAL
HUERTA AND THE ARMY—THE FALL
OF MADERO.

On the evening of the same Sunday, which was the 9th of February, President Madero motored to Cuernavaca accompanied by some of his trusted friends, ostensibly seeking General Angeles, although the latter could have been reached just as easily by telegram. It became known, however, that Madero's intention, when he undertook that trip, was to conclude arrangements with the governor of the State of Morelos, Patricio Leyva, who was in his turn to negotiate with the Zapata brothers in regard to the plan of campaign to be adopted against General Diaz.

There is not the slightest doubt ~~but~~ that President Madero always protected the Zapatist movement. He did it at first, as I have mentioned elsewhere, for the purpose of holding in check the provisional government of de la Barra, and later for purely sordid reasons.

Fernandez Rojas (*Loc. Cit.*), echoing the current opinion, states that the existence of Zapatism in the prosperous State of Morelos "had only one meaning for the Madero family; by keeping that region in a constant state of hostility it was possible to lower considerably the value of real estate, and as the landowners were unable to protect their interests in Morelos, the Madero family found itself in a position to acquire valuable sugar plantations in that State at a ridiculously low price."

To sustain his statement that Madero and Zapata were working in accord to maintain a state of hostility in Morelos, Rojas cites the following facts which are unanimously admitted:

"1. Madero was always opposed to the

annihilation of Zapatism, which could not have resisted General Huerta's energetic methods of warfare.

"2. The engineer Patricio Leyva owed his elevation to the highest dignity of the State to an electoral fraud abetted by the Center to the end that the government and Zapata be kept in close contact through the intermediary of Patricio Leyva himself.

"3. The ordinance used by the Zapatists came, like that used by the army, from the national arsenal."

Madero spent only a few hours in Cuernavaca; he returned to the capitol as hurriedly as he had left it, and reached Mexico City on the morning of the 10th, displaying more confidence than ever in the final outcome of the struggle. A few hours later General Angeles, followed by a column of over a thousand men, arrived.

I shall not describe in detail the revolution which for ten days made the capital of the Republic a scene of terror and desolation. During that time Madero retained his optimism, assuring Mexico

and the world that in a few hours he would subdue the rebels holding the citadel, although they were masters of the situation and had the support of the whole country. The inspired press sent out every day extravagant appeals for help for the government, and incited the people to rise against the cultured classes and the high interests. Pamphlets were circulated which brimmed over with threats and misleading information. Day after day people were shot without trial, simply on suspicion.

This situation alarmed the diplomats, who felt called upon to proffer their services in order to end a warfare waged in the streets of the Mexican capital in which the majority of victims were non-combatants. The American ambassador and the ministers plenipotentiaries for Spain and Germany conferred with President Madero and offered their services to bring about through diplomatic channels an agreement with the Felixists. Madero answered with a smile that he would surely dominate the situation within

twenty-four hours, or, at the utmost, thirty-six hours, for the citadel would fall as soon as Colonel Rubio Navarrete would assume control of the artillery. Thereupon the diplomats betook themselves to the citadel and conferred with General Diaz, who recognized the gravity of the situation and explained that he was powerless to cope with it, for it had been created by the government. He would confine himself, he added, to defensive action, and expressed his earnest desire to avoid, as far as possible, further calamities.

News was received from the United States which caused a good deal of consternation. It was rumored that an American army of thirty-five thousand men was ready to enter Mexico; that ten warships were in readiness to sail from Guantanamo bound for Mexican ports, and that four thousand marines would be landed any minute from the cruisers anchored off Vera Cruz, and would march on the capital.

Then it was that President Madero

cabled on the 14th to President Taft explaining to him the situation in Mexico, and stating that the trouble would be over in a few hours, for the rebels had suffered considerable losses and were entirely demoralized. There was not a word of truth in that dispatch; but Madero, irresponsible as ever, had no doubt as to the final outcome.

On the 16th, President Taft telegraphed his answer explaining that whatever measures he had taken were simply measures of precaution; he denied having ordered the landing of marines; he considered it useless to renew the assurance of his friendly feelings towards Mexico after the United States had shown for two years its patience and good will; on account of the special friendship and of the relations uniting the two countries, however, he could not emphasize too much the vital importance for Madero to restore peace and order, which the American government hoped to see firmly established in Mexico.

The message ended with a significant

warning. President Taft added in conclusion that as far as the anxiety expressed by Madero in his despatch was concerned, he considered it his duty to state, sincerely and unreservedly, that the events of the past two years which had just culminated in a most ominous state of affairs were creating a very unfavorable impression in the United States, and had convinced many that the most imperative duty of the hour was to relieve the suspense.

Francisco L. de la Barra, who had served as provisional president at the fall of President Diaz, endeavored to act as mediator, and had several confidential talks with President Madero, giving him to understand the danger with which the situation was freighted, and advising him to compromise with the revolutionists. The most Madero ever conceded was to authorize de la Barra to inquire about the demands of the Felixists. De la Barra then went to the citadel to confer with General Diaz, who manifested his willingness to end the hostilities on the sole con-



FELIX DIAZ

dition that the president, Vice-President Pino Suarez, and the members of the cabinet tender their resignation. De la Barra called once more on Madero, who, after hearing what the Felixists expected, answered curtly that he would never resign, and that nothing but death could remove him from the presidency, for he represented legality.

The following is a résumé of the situation as it appeared to an eye witness:

“The officers, fighting under the orders of General Huerta, were hostile to the government; so were the various commanders of the army corps and their soldiers, who were being sacrificed in protracted and sterile campaigns, and were beginning to feel a deep hatred for this ruler whom the press represented as a ridiculous personage, and whose adversary reminded them of the famous chief Porfirio Diaz.

“Only the rurales, who were dispatched to the slaughter house column after column, were faithful to the government,

bought as they were by the honors showered upon their chiefs.

“General Huerta felt the terrible pressure of the hostility which all his subordinates manifested towards the government; at the same time he remembered all the calumnies slung at him and the efforts made to exile him by the very man for whom many army officers, his friends, were fighting among themselves. He was unable, however, to take any radical decision, for the government distrusted him openly.

“On two occasions General Huerta was to be arrested, but both times President Madero was prevailed upon not to confirm the order he had given orally.

“The diplomatic corps contributed to aggravate the position of the men who surrounded Francisco I. Madero. The notes sent by the foreign ministers and by friendly governments asked more insistently from day to day for a rapid solution of the difficulties.

“More and more complaints were pouring every day into the national

palace from those whose property was destroyed in the course of the artillery duel that was taking place.

"It was idle to expect any action on the part of Parliament, for the anti-governmental deputies had fled the capital to avoid being shot; and Madero's partisans, fearful of the consequences which any personal action might bring upon their heads, also remained in hiding.

"The members of the Senate were equally inactive, for they realized that they could not cope with the situation without the help of the Chamber." ("The Bloody Ten Days," by Gonzalo N. Espinosa, Joaquin Pina y Carlos R. Ortiz.)

In the face of such deplorable and hopeless conditions and in the face of inevitable intervention by the United States, a group of senators met on the 14th at the house of Senator Sebastian Camacho: Emilio Rabasa, Rafael Pimentel, Tomas R. Macmanus, Carlos Aguirre, Francisco L. de la Barra, Victor Manuel Castillo, Luis C. Curiel,

Juan C. Fernandez, Jesus Flores Magon, Ricardo Guzman, and Guillermo Obregon. After lengthy deliberations they decided to call on the military commander General Huerta and advise him to ask President Madero for his formal resignation, inasmuch as this seemed to be the only possible solution of the problem. Their resolution, however, was not carried out, for just at that time Premier Pedro Lascurain sent to Senator Sebastian Camacho the following communication:

“Acting upon directions of the president of the Republic, I have the honor of asking you to call a secret session extraordinary of the Senate, at which the executive will address you in regard to the present situation. Kindly inform me of the time at which the honorable senators will meet in their chamber to the end that due safety be assured to them and that the undersigned secretary of state be able to attend and to address you in behalf of the executive.”

I consider it necessary to reproduce

here in its entirety a most important historical document, the report of the secret session of the Senate held the following day, the 15th of February.

After the minutes were read the secretary of foreign affairs, the Honorable Pedro Lascurain, took the floor to address the assembly. The Honorable Lascurain declared that the Mexican situation was extremely delicate from the point of view of international relations and in particular from the point of view of the relations with the United States; he said that telegrams had been received from Washington revealing the decision, already partly carried out, of the American government to send warships and transports with landing forces into the Mexican waters of the Gulf and the Pacific. The honorable secretary of foreign affairs added that at one o'clock that morning the ambassador from the United States had asked several members of the diplomatic corps to come and confer with him at his embassy, informing them of the impending arrival of the ships and ex-

pressing firmly the opinion that 3,000 marines should be sent to Mexico City to protect the lives and interests of the American and other foreign residents. "There is no time to lose," the Honorable Lascurain said in conclusion; "every minute counts, and in view of the imminence of a foreign intervention with which we are threatened, I call upon the Senate to adopt for the sake of the country measures calculated to avert that danger."

Invited by the vice-president to relate the facts which had come to his knowledge while he was acting as mediator, Senator de la Barra said that on Monday, the 10th instant, he had written to the president of the Republic placing himself at his disposal as a possible mediator, if he could be of any service in this grave conjuncture; the president had answered that letter at midnight, stating that the government was not inclined to treat with the rebels in the citadel. On Friday, the 14th, General Angeles called at the residence of Senator de la Barra, inviting him in behalf of the president to go and

confer with him at the national palace; a conference took place at which he was entrusted with the mission of going to the citadel and discussing with the revolutionary leaders the possibility of a three-day truce, during which a possible solution might be agreed upon for the present situation, so as to stave off, above all things, the danger of intervention on the part of a foreign power, which might begin to land troops to protect its subjects and the other foreigners residing in the capital.

Senator de la Barra said that he discharged his mission but failed to obtain favorable results for the revolutionary leaders. Messrs. Diaz and Mondragon refused to accept the proposed armistice and to negotiate on any basis except the resignation of the president, vice-president and secretaries of state; the senator reported his findings to the president of the Republic; he considered then that his mission was at an end, but remained at the disposal of the first magistrate, ready to render any service that might con-

tribute to re-establish the peace of the nation.

Senator de la Barra added for the benefit of the senators who were not informed of that fact, that the vice-president of the Senate had called to the house of Sebastian Camacho all the senators who could be reached by telephone. The call for that meeting was explained by the note of the secretary of foreign affairs mentioned above; the meeting did not begin its deliberations until the secretary of foreign affairs had appeared and made a detailed report upon the gravity of the situation, especially in regard to the attitude of the American government. It was decided that a call be sent out for a meeting of the whole Senate for the present meeting, as the group which convened at Senator Camacho's did not have the necessary authority to make its decisions respected, an authority which only a majority of the senators located at the time in the Federal District possessed.

The Honorable Senator Valdivieso moved that a commission be appointed to

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suggest measures to be adopted by the Senate.

The Honorable Senator José Diego Fernandez declared that considering the gravity of this situation, he was opposed to the preparation of a commission report and to the usual procedure. The Senate should approve at once without waste of time the following resolutions:

First.—Resolved that the president of the Republic shall be advised, in view of the supreme necessity of saving the national sovereignty, to tender his resignation from his high office.

Second.—That the same procedure be followed in regard to the vice-president of the Republic.

Third.—That a commission be appointed to apprise President Madero and Vice-President Pino Suarez of the decisions arrived at.

The honorable secretary of foreign affairs moved that all the senators present betake themselves to the national palace to apprise Messrs. Madero and Pino

Suarez of the decisions taken. The motion was carried unanimously.

Senator Rabaza nominated as spokesman of the senators present Senator Gumersindo Enriquez.

The Honorable Enriquez moved that Senator Diego Fernandez be selected as spokesman. Senator Rabaza moved that both Senator Enriquez and Senator Diego Fernandez be appointed spokesmen, no other senator besides them to be authorized in any way to speak in behalf of the Senate. This motion and the preceding ones were carried unanimously.

The twenty-five senators betook themselves to the national palace accompanied by the secretary of foreign affairs, who went at once to the office of the president to inform President Madero that the Senate desired to apprise him of important decisions it had taken. The senators waited half an hour or so in the room assigned to them. They were then admitted into one of the ante-rooms of the president's office where, after a wait of twenty-five minutes, they were met by

the Honorable Ernesto Madero, former secretary of finances, the Honorable Manuel Bonilla, secretary of public works, the Honorable Jaime Gurza, secretary of communications, and the Honorable Pedro Lascurain, secretary of foreign affairs. The secretary of finances informed the senators that the president of the Republic had left twenty minutes before accompanied by General García Pena, to visit the military positions of the government; that he himself and the other secretaries of state could not represent the first magistrate or speak in his behalf; he considered himself justified, however, in informing the senators that the government had sufficient resources to dominate the situation, for it had received important reinforcements; the citadel would be retaken within a few days, for Brigadier-General Felix Diaz did not dispose of enough troops to resist the government victoriously; the situation of the Republic in general was satisfactory, for no uprising had taken place in the States; the State of Puebla had remained faith-

ful, and it was said that Colonel Pradilla had taken charge of it in the capacity of military commander; he did not consider seriously the eventuality of an American intervention; the president was expecting an answer to a cablegram which he had sent to President Taft, a cablegram which he read to the senators and in which President Madero was asking President Taft to revoke the order for the dispatch of warships and of landing troops; it was necessary to wait for the answer, as President Madero could be trusted to do everything which patriotism would demand; the resignation of the first magistrate tendered at this time would only have dire results, for it would undoubtedly be followed by a state of anarchy; according to information received, uprisings would take place at once in seven or eight of the States; ninety per cent. of the nation, including the privileged classes, stood with the president, the remaining ten per cent. being only made up of politicians belonging to the opposition.

The Honorable Gurza, minister of communications, announced that he had received telegrams from every State, on the strength of which he could affirm that the situation was perfectly satisfactory.

Senator Enriquez, addressing himself to the minister of finances, said: "Mr. Minister, speaking in behalf of the senators here assembled who have done Senator Diego Fernandez and myself the honor to designate us as their spokesmen, I beg you to tell us whether the president of the Republic is not going to receive us when twenty-five of us senators have come to him to inform him of most important decisions we have taken under the most serious and most painful circumstances of our country's life. You have told us that the president was out and had gone to inspect the advance military posts of the line investing the citadel; you have not told us, however, whether he would receive us later, and you have given us no information on the situation in the country at large and in the capital in par-

ticular; in order to do this you would have to confer with the president."

The minister answered that the president had left twenty minutes before, having gone out with General Garcia Pena for the reasons previously mentioned.

Senator Enriquez added: "If the president does not intend to receive us and if it is to his ministers that we will have to explain the reasons which caused us to solicit an audience from the incumbent of the executive power, I consider it as my duty to make the following statements. The president invited the Senate through the Department of Foreign Affairs to meet in a session extraordinary for the purpose of hearing a report made by the relevant secretary upon grave news received relative to the sending of warships by the United States of America to the port of Vera Cruz with orders to land armed forces which would march upon the capital of Mexico to protect, if necessary, the interests and the life of Americans residing in our country. It was impossible to obtain a quorum yesterday when only

twelve senators were present, and to-day when only twenty-five met in the chamber; this body, although it did not assume the character of a Senate, heard a report of Minister Lascurain which produced the deepest impression, and a report from Mr. de la Barra upon the unsuccessful negotiations he had conducted by request of the president of the Republic with the rebels occupying the citadel, with the object of declaring an armistice and appointing a peace commission; after hearing those reports the senators came to an unanimous conclusion (there are with us now three dissenting members, the Honorable Magaloni, Gomez and Tagle, but they were not present at the meeting in which we took the decisions I will now mention): It was resolved that the president, vice-president, and members of the cabinet should resign their high offices, obeying thereby the highest patriotic considerations; without that act of abnegation on their part, considering the attitude of the rebels as pictured to us by Mr. de la

Barra, there could not be any hope for peace. It was further resolved that the senators present at that meeting should call upon the president in a body and inform him of their decisions, which had been inspired by the purest patriotism and the most sincere confidence that the first magistrate of the nation is still animated by the spirit of which he has given so many proofs.

“Having come to this place, Mr. Minister, we face the fact that we cannot address ourselves directly to the president to discharge our mission; and the only thing left to us is to ask you to explain to the first magistrate the object of the call which the senators present have paid on him. Tell him how sorry we are not to have been able to relate to him personally the resolutions we passed at the meeting called through the Department of Foreign Affairs; tell him also how earnestly this body of senators beg him to render to his country the service which they expect of him, a service which will redound to his glory and entitle him to the grati-

tude of posterity. For it is not only on the battlefield and through bloodshed that one acquires glory and fame; the country can be served more efficiently through an act of sublime self-renunciation such as we expect from him, and for which the country is anxiously waiting.

“Our attitude, Mr. Minister, has not been modified by the information that you have kindly given us upon the general situation of the country, and upon the armed strife which is taking place in our capital. It is not those various incidents which have prompted us to take such a step, but the fear of complications with the United States, which are likely to jeopardize our national independence; this is a danger before which all selfish considerations must be laid aside, and the most legitimate rights must be waived, for the interests of the country must be held above all human considerations.”

The Honorable Diego Fernandez took the floor to declare himself in entire sympathy with the sentiments expressed by Senator Enriquez.

The meeting adjourned.

* * *

The senators did not give up their patriotic purpose, and after many meetings and many useless attempts at conferring with President Madero they were at last received by him on the morning of Tuesday, the 18th. To every one of their remonstrances he answered that under no consideration would he ever resign; he would rather be the president of a people of corpses and of a nation in ruins, rather than tender his resignation, he said, for he represented legality.

The senators withdrew from that conference convinced that there was nothing to be expected from Madero, and they decided upon a final step. They went to the office of the military commander and called on General Huerta, trying to overcome his scruples. Huerta once more denied their request. In taking leave of him the senators told him that they had at last the satisfaction of having done all there was in their power to stop the useless shedding of blood, and that

history would judge whether the army had done right or wrong in supporting a man who had cost his country so many lives. The only alternative for the army, they said in conclusion, was faithfulness to Madero, or faithfulness to the country.

These last words impressed the old soldier so deeply that, as the senators were leaving him, he detained them a while and said:

“Well, gentlemen, I too am greatly worried over the conditions that prevail in our country. I have already told you that I cannot strike such a blow as you mention, but I could refuse to recognize President Madero if directed to do so by the legislative and judicial powers. You may confer with the men invested with judicial power, and if the two bodies agree I will consider it proper to tell President Madero that he must resign at once.”

The senators withdrew, to return soon afterwards accompanied by a majority of the justices of the Supreme Court; the latter assured General Huerta that they

were agreeable to the proposition made by the members of the legislature.

General Huerta conferred at once with his subordinates, and finding that two of them, Generals Felipe Angeles and José Delgado were not in accord with him, he excluded them from the conference and later placed them under arrest.

General Huerta gave orders to General Aureliano Blanquet, a valiant and trusted man, to take possession of the national palace with the 29th battalion, of which he was commander, after which he ordered Lieutenant-Colonel Riveroll and Major Izquierdo to go to the presidential palace, where Madero and the members of his cabinet were at the time, and to request him respectfully in behalf of the Legislature and the Army to tender his resignation. What took place then is related as follows by Adjutant Fernando Troncoso of the military commander's staff, who was an eye witness of the scene:

"Ex-President Madero was seated with several members of his cabinet in one of the parlors of the palace when Lieuten-



GENERAL AURELIANO BLANQUET

ant-Colonel Riveroll appeared before him asking him, in behalf of the Senate and the Army, for his immediate resignation. Madero listened to his words, then took a revolver and fired at the unfortunate officer, who fell on the floor, never to rise again; thereupon Major Izquierdo appeared and was also shot dead by Captain Garmendia. The president, accompanied by several people, took the elevator, and when he reached the main entrance to the palace, seeing the armed forces standing in front of it, he exclaimed:

“Here is the president of the Republic, gentlemen.”

The valiant General Blanquet, revolver in hand and leading the greater part of his battalion, marched towards President Madero and, ordering that no shot be fired, took him prisoner. What happened afterwards is known to everybody.

Ernesto Madero, minister of finance, and Jaime Curza, minister of communications, escaped in the disorder that followed. Rafael Hernandez, minister of state, was freed on parole. President

Madero, Vice-President Pino Suarez, and the other ministers were held prisoners in various rooms in the basement of the palace, guarded by sentinels.

The bells of every church in the capital were tolled to announce Madero's fall, and every class of the population received the news with undisguised pleasure.

General Huerta sent out at once the following manifesto, which was circulated broadcast:

"TO THE MEXICAN PEOPLE:

"In view of the difficult circumstances under which the nation, and within the last days, the capital of the Republic have labored, in view of what I may call the state of anarchy due to the incapable government of Mr. Madero, I hereby assume the executive power. Until the Houses of the Union can meet and debate upon the present situation I shall hold Francisco I. Madero and the members of his cabinet, to the end that this point being settled and every effort made to unite all the minds in this historical

moment, we may all work together to re-establish peace, which for our nation is a question of life and death.

Issued in the Executive Palace, February 18, 1913.

The General Military Commander in charge of the Executive Power.

V. HUERTA."

CHAPTER V

THE PACT OF THE CITADEL—THE RESIGNATION OF PRESIDENT MADERO AND VICE-PRESIDENT PINO SUAREZ—THE ORIGIN OF THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT—THE DE FACTO GOVERNMENT BECOMES A GOVERNMENT DE JURE ACCORDING TO THE MEXICAN CONSTITUTION.

As soon as Madero and Pino Suarez were deposed, General Huerta considered that the hostilities between the federal forces and the Felixists should come to an end. His opinion was transmitted to General Felix Diaz, who agreed fully with him, since the revolt he had led had accomplished its purpose. Arrangements were made for a conference in which the two leaders would settle formally and definitely the present situation and decide upon the course to be followed in the immediate future.

At eight o'clock of the same day (February 18) General Huerta went to the Department of State where Briga-

dier General Felix Diaz was awaiting him and the conference took place. General Huerta was accompanied by Lieutenant Colonel Joaquin Mass and Enrique Cepeda, C. E. General Diaz had with him Rodolfo Reyes, Fidencio Hernandez, General Mondragon, and several of the officers who had fought with him in the Citadel. A protracted discussion on the question of merging the various political groups gave unsatisfactory results, as every one present expressed diverging opinions; the two leaders were the ones who spoke least.

Finally some one suggested that in order to shorten the proceedings the two generals be left together to settle the question the best they could, with due regard to the interest of the nation.

This advice was heeded and within a few minutes Huerta and Diaz found themselves in perfect accord; they called in their friends, informed them of the understanding they had arrived at and asked them to write down the following protocol:

“In the city of Mexico, at nine-thirty in the evening, the 18th of February, 1913, Generals Felix Diaz and Victoriano Huerta having met in conference, the former assisted by Messrs. Fidencio Hernandez and Rodolfo Reyes, the latter by Lieutenant Colonel Joaquin Mass and Enrique Cepeda, General Huerta stated that the situation created by the government of Mr. Madero being unbearable, he had, in order to prevent the further shedding of blood and to safeguard national unity, placed under arrest said Madero, several members of his cabinet, and various other persons; that he wished to express to General Diaz the sincere wish that the political elements General Diaz represented return into the fold, and that all parties at last reunited put an end to this deplorable situation. General Diaz stated that his only reason for raising the standard of revolt was a desire to protect the national welfare, and that he was ready to make any sacrifice that would prove beneficial to the country.

After a discussion in which the above mentioned gentlemen took part, the following resolutions were agreed upon:

1. The former incumbent of the Executive Power is not to be recognized henceforth, and the political forces represented by Generals Diaz and Huerta are to unite in opposing all efforts to restore him to power.

2. The present situation shall be settled with the least possible delay and by the most convenient lawful means, and Generals Diaz and Huerta will do all in their power to enable the latter to assume within seventy-two hours the provisional presidency of the Republic with the following cabinet:

Foreign affairs: Francisco Leon de la Barra.

Finance: Toribio Esquivel Obregon.

War: General Manuel Mondragon.

Public Works: Alberto Robles Gil,
C.E.

State: Alberto Garcia Granados, C.E.

Justice: Rodolfo Reyes.

Education: Jorge Vera Estanol.

Communications: David de la Fuente, C.E.

A new department to be known as the department of agriculture shall be created with the purpose of preparing a solution of the agrarian questions and related problems; the portfolio of this department is to be held by Manuel Garza Aldape.

Whatever changes may be introduced in the proposed cabinet shall be agreed upon in a way similar to the way the cabinet itself was agreed upon.

3. Until such time as the situation shall have been settled lawfully, Generals Huerta and Diaz shall remain the depositories of all authority that is necessary to give full protection to all interests.

4. General Diaz declines to be a member of the provisional cabinet when General Huerta assumes the provisional presidency, so as to retain his entire freedom of action, and to foster the interests of his party during the coming elections, an attitude he wishes to make very clear

to everyone, and upon which the undersigned are fully agreed.

5. An official note shall be sent at once to the representatives of foreign nations, mentioning solely that the incumbent of the executive power has been removed and that steps will be taken at once to select his successor, and that in the meantime Generals Diaz and Huerta shall exert all their authority to assure full protection to all foreign residents.

6. All rebels shall be invited at once to cease hostilities, and all the cases shall be settled separately.

General Victoriano Huerta
General Felix Diaz

Such is the document known to history as the "Pact of the Citadel", although it was concluded not in that edifice but in the department of state.

General Huerta, who, until then, had only held the title of military commander in charge of the executive power, constituted himself the official leader of the revolution.

He sent through official channels to the dean of the diplomatic corps, Henry Lane Wilson, ambassador from the United States, a full account of all that had transpired. In that communication he stated that the only motive of his action had been patriotism, and that he was not actuated by any personal aims; that his only purpose was to reestablish peace in the republic and to safeguard the interests of foreigners. He also asked him to transmit this information to the American government.

The ambassador from the United States answered in his own name and in behalf of the diplomatic corps, acknowledging receipt of the note and its contents, and expressing the hope that General Huerta would invite all Mexicans without distinction to cooperate in his work of pacification.

At the same time Mr. Wilson, in his official capacity of ambassador, sent another note to General Huerta stating that he had no intention of interfering in the national affairs of Mexico, but sug-

gested discreetly that General Huerta and his army place themselves at the disposal of the Congress of the Union. He added that he would also broach the subject to General Felix Diaz.

General Huerta stated verbally to the bearers of those notes that he was fully conscious of his responsibilities and that his most earnest desire was to return as soon as possible to the life of a private citizen, and that as long as he would be vested with the supreme authority all foreigners could count on his friendship and protection.

The next morning Generals Huerta and Diaz issued the following proclamation to the Mexican people:

“The unbearable and perilous situation which obtained in the capital caused the army represented by the undersigned to cooperate fraternally in saving our country, and in consequence of that action the nation can now rest in peace.

“All the liberties compatible with order shall be guaranteed under the personal responsibility of the undersigned officers,

who will assume henceforth the commandment and the reins of the government in so far as this will be necessary in order to give full protection to natives and foreigners, and who engage themselves to settle the situation on a lawful basis within seventy-two hours.

"The army exhorts the citizens to continue in the noble attitude of respect and moderation which they have preserved to this day, and invites all the revolutionary bands to join hands for the purpose of establishing permanent peace in the nation.

"Mexico, February 18, 1913.

Felix Diaz. V. Huerta."

General Huerta's government became then a *de facto* government, and although this was quite sufficient for the time being, the new incumbent of the executive power considered it as imperative to comply at once with the constitutional provisions. He therefore addressed the same day a message to the Federal Congress giving an account of the incidents that had taken place. Fol-

lowing this the Chamber of Deputies met the same day (February 19) and remained in session from four in the afternoon until eleven at night to discuss the resignation of President Madero and Vice-President Pino Suarez.

The Chamber appointed a commission composed of Deputies Francisco de Olaguibel, Francisco Escudero, and José I. Novelo, whose duty would be to call on Madero and Pino Suarez, detained in the National Palace, and to ask them to tender their resignation.

The commission did not find them readily amenable to reason; Madero repeated with insistence that he represented legality. Finally Madero and Suarez yielded and tendered their resignation in a joint note which read:

To the Honorable Secretaries of the Chamber of Deputies:

In consideration of the events that took place yesterday in Mexico, and to insure the peace of the nation, we hereby formally resign the positions of president and

vice-president to which we were respectively elected. We do this under protest.

Mexico, February 19, 1913.

Francisco I. Madero
José M. Pino Suarez

At 8.45 the chamber presented that document to the minister of foreign affairs, Pedro Lascurain. It was referred to the second committee on state affairs; and the third committee on constitutional questions, which issued almost immediately the following orders:

“1. That the resignation of the Honorable Francisco I. Madero as President of the Republic be accepted.

2. That the resignation of the Honorable José M. Pino Suarez as Vice-President of the Republic be accepted.

3. That Pedro Lascurain, Minister of Foreign Affairs, be called upon to occupy, in virtue of his office, the position of provisional president.

To be communicated to all the parties concerned.”

The order was approved *in toto* without

discussion. When the items were put in discussion the resignation of Madero was approved by 123 votes against 4; that of Pino Suarez by 119 against 8.

In consequence of which Pedro Lascurain was declared the constitutional provisional president of the Republic and took at once the oath of office.

In the course of the same session a communication from the new provisional president was read; in this he informed the Chamber that he had appointed General Huerta Minister of State. Thereupon Mr. Lascurain tendered his resignation as provisional president. The relevant committees of the Chamber directed that his resignation be accepted and that General Huerta, minister of state, be called to assume, *ex officio*, the vacant post. The order having been approved by the Chamber, General Huerta took the oath of office at once and became henceforth *de facto* and *de jure* constitutional President of the United States of Mexico.

The foregoing is ample evidence that

General Huerta did not take the presidency by force and violence. He held the executive power in his hands for a few hours only in virtue of his position as commander of the army and in accordance with the Pact of the Citadel. He turned it over immediately, however, in obedience to the will of the Chamber of Deputies to the man who was, according to the constitution, its lawful incumbent. When he again assumed the power he did so in a perfectly constitutional way, authorized by a vote of the Chamber of Deputies convened in lawful meeting in conformity with the legal procedure governing such cases.

This does away with the main objection which the government of the United States has raised to recognizing our provisional government. This objection is totally unfounded or rather the foundation upon which it reposes is either a mistaken notion or a lie.

The press of the United States has on several occasions expressed doubts as to whether Madero and Pino Suarez had

actually tendered their resignations. I read very recently, on December 24, 1913, in the usually careful *New York Times* statements made by Mr. Frederick Imman Monsen, from which I may quote the following lines:

"No one knows," he said, "just when he was killed, except that it happened at night. After repeated refusals on the part of Madero to resign he was removed one night from his room and taken into an adjoining one, where his resignation was placed before him in writing.

"A pen was put in his hand and he was asked to sign his name. He refused; whereupon the Mexican leader grasped the pen and shaking it in his face cried, 'I will sign your name to this and, Madero, you shall never live to deny the signature.'

"That night Madero and several of his advisers were killed."

Mr. Monsen did not know of what he was talking. There is no proof that Huerta saw Madero, or asked him personally for his resignation, or that Madero was killed the night after he had re-

signed (February 19). He was killed on the night of the 22nd, that is three full days after he had tendered his resignation; there is no proof that any of his advisers were killed that night.

It is regrettable that the sayings of persons who have neither the time nor the desire to ascertain the actual facts should find such an echo in the American press. It is still more deplorable that the government at Washington should lend an ear to reports of such a nature without making due efforts to verify their accuracy.

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CHAPTER VI

GUSTAVO MADERO AND BASO ARE SENTENCED TO BE SHOT—THE DEATH OF EX-PRESIDENT MADERO AND EX-VICE-PRESIDENT PINO SUAREZ.

Gustavo Madero was said to be Francisco Madero's favorite brother. Public opinion considered him as the power behind the throne, as the instigator of all the crimes perpetrated by the government; he was held responsible for every act of iniquity committed during the Maderist regime. His friends, on the contrary, pretended that more than once he quarrelled with Francisco over some of the latter's frenzied doings, and that the president would have been much better off if he had followed some of his advice. I do not know which of these two views of Gustavo's character is the correct one; one fact, however, which cannot be gainsaid is that Gustavo was the organizer of the "Porra", the most odious and most funest

society ever started in Mexico, a sort of political black hand whose members were all visibly and efficiently protected by Gustavo Madero.

Regarding the circumstances of Gustavo's arrest many romantic stories have been told. Some say that he was planning to poison General Huerta at a banquet which he had prepared and which took place at the very time when he was arrested, "for the Madero family always managed to let their rejoicings coincide with scenes of national mourning."

In fact the banquet took place on February 18, at the very hour when President Madero was apprehended.

Gustavo Madero was dining at the restaurant Gambrinus with Generals José Delgado, Agustin Sangines, and Colonel Francisco Romero, who had just been promoted to the rank of brigadier-general and in whose honor the banquet was given. Of a sudden Lieutenant Luis Fuentes, accompanied by an escort of Chapultepec foresters, appeared in the dining-room, and, addressing Gustavo

Madero, informed him that he was under arrest. Gustavo tried to reach his pistol but the officer foiled that attempt by pressing the muzzle of his revolver against Madero's forehead, and Madero surrendered. He was locked up in a cellar room of the restaurant, guarded by a sentinel, and sometime during the night he was taken to the National Palace amid expressions of hatred on the part of the crowd which had learned of the happenings and which would have lynched him if his escort hadn't protected him.

At midnight he was removed from the Palace to the Citadel, and early the next morning was shot to death.

The authors of the "Bloody Ten Days" relate this incident as follows:

"The Felixists, occupying the fortress, became very excited when they saw that Gustavo Madero was in their power. The defenders of the fortress shouted, and the mob had shouted on the streets, demanding the head of the prisoner to avenge the deaths of General Ruiz and c

all the unfortunate victims who had been sacrificed in the battle waged the first day.

“General Diaz denied his soldiers’ demands, for his prisoner was absolutely unstrung, and shaking with fear at the thought of being put to death in the Felixist fortress.

“As the prisoner was transferred from one part of the fortress to another an incident took place which still appears unexplainable, but which most people consider as a part of a premeditated plan.

“As Gustavo Madero and his guards were crossing the small square where the statue of General Morelos stands, someone, probably the adjutant to General Mondragon, fired a gun at Gustavo. The latter, hearing the report, tried to flee to shelter himself in one of the artillery wagons which stood near by; several soldiers, however, discharged their guns at the fugitive, who fell dead, having been hit and sent rolling on the ground by the first shot.”

The truth is that Gustavo as well as Adolfo Baso were sent to the Citadel to be

shot. At 2 o'clock in the morning he was taken out of his cell by an officer leading a platoon of soldiers, but, on his way to the place of execution, he begged for mercy and in panicky terror cried out that he was only a civilian, that he had never mixed with politics, and offered all his fortune in exchange for his life. When he reached the small square in front of the Citadel, he tried to run away and the escort opened fire on him, shooting him through the back.

The attendant of the Palace, Captain Adolfo Baso of the navy, was also taken from the Palace where he had been kept and removed to the Citadel. Baso was responsible for the terrible slaughter of the defenseless crowd which occurred in the first encounter before the Palace; he was the one who discharged the machine guns which produced that horrible butchery.

Baso left the fortress surrounded by the platoon that was to execute him and when reaching the small square said:

"What are you going to do to me?"

Shoot me? Please notice that I am dying like a man. I want to look at the sky. . . . I can't see the Great Bear. . . . Oh, yes! there it is shining beautifully."

He distributed a few trinkets among the soldiers, gave a few messages for his family and exclaimed:

"I am 62. You see that I am dying like a man."

And opening the large cape which he wore he threw out his chest and gave the order to fire. A volley mowed him down.

* * *

As soon as President Madero and Vice-President Pino Suarez were arrested there was much speculation as to the fate that awaited them. Both were the object of deep hatred; Pino Suarez more perhaps than Madero. Army officers and soldiers were in favor of their execution; the people were greatly incensed over the slaughter of harmless folk and the many executions that had taken place without process of law. The lives of both men were in great danger, and therefore the government decided to transfer them



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from the Palace to the penitentiary, where they would be safe against any attempt on the part of the mob or the army. This decision was agreed upon by Generals Huerta, Diaz, Mondragon, and Blanquet, and Mr. Rodolfo Reyes.

The press of Mexico City published on February 23 the following item:

“The President of the Republic called a meeting of his cabinet at 12.30 p.m. to report that Messrs. Francisco I. Madero and José M. Pino Suarez, who were held in the National Palace at the disposition of the secretary of war, were being removed, according to the decision taken, to the penitentiary, which establishment had been placed, for more safety, under the command of an army officer; the automobiles carrying them were only a short distance from the penitentiary when they were stopped by a group of armed men; the men of the escort stepped out to defend themselves; the number of the aggressors increased and the prisoners tried to run away; a shooting affray took place in the course of which two of the aggres-

sors were wounded and one killed and both prisoners lost their lives.

"The president and his cabinet ordered the judicial authority to inquire into this attempt against the life of military prisoners (as Mr. Madero and Mr. Pino Suarez were). A very thorough inquiry was conducted under the personal direction of the military attorney general. The minister of justice has ruled that, considering the exceptional character of the case, the Attorney-General of the Republic is to take up the case after the preliminary inquiry is terminated.

"The government deplotes this incident; for more safety it had that evening asked the minister of justice to prepare the case against the prisoners for the following Monday. As at that time several friends of Mr. Madero were endeavoring to help in finding a solution for that difficult and delicate problem, the government, to protect itself and to protect its prisoners, had appointed Colonel Luis Ballesteros director of the penitentiary

and given him very strict orders to be in readiness for any emergency.

"The government promises that justice shall take its course. The officers commanding the escort have been held and all the possible evidence is being collected. The whole truth shall be known regarding this disgraceful incident, which, however, is not unexplainable under the present painful circumstances."

Major Francisco Cardenas of the 7th Rurales, who was in charge of the transfer of the prisoners, informed the press that a first attack had been made at Lecumberri Street upon the escort which found itself, a little later, confronted by a group of men who opened fire upon the automobiles. Those men were in ambush only a few yards from the prison. The men who fired the first shots were lying flat in the gutter.

"The prisoners tried to take advantage of the confusion and to run away. That attempt cost them their lives, for the men who had set out to free them (those who attacked the automobiles could not have

had any other purpose) fired shots rather carelessly. The Rurales of the escort also discharged their guns in self defense. Mr. Madero and Pino Suarez fell down, probably struck by bullets from both sides."

Such is the official version.

A different version was circulated, according to which the prisoners had been shot by their escort. The authors of the "Bloody Ten Days", whom I have quoted several times, give credence to the popular version and add: "The news of Mr. Madero's death did not create much of an impression, nor did it cause any disturbance. A few people from the lowest classes and a few workingmen were the only ones to cheer Madero's body when it was removed from the penitentiary where the autopsy had been held."

Carlos Toro in his book "The Fall of Madero" expressed himself as follows:

"Let us say it quite frankly: nobody cared to preserve the lives of those dangerous apostles of violence and anarchy, and their death was considered by their friends and enemies alike as a national

necessity. The bitterness, the anger, the feuds so sedulously kept up by those two men ended with them; it was plain common sense that demanded their extermination. There was plenty of deplorable evidence at hand that those men, incapable of governing, were dangerous agitators.

“Whether this was a genuine assault or a premediated execution, the nation’s will was done. If a crime was committed it was a collective crime, for society was demanding with insistence the suppression of the two men mainly responsible for the disorderly conditions affecting the Republic.”

José Fernandez Rojas, in his “Mexican Revolution,” writes:

“That version (the official one) has not found general acceptance; there is nothing incredible about it, however, and it is perfectly within the limits of the possible. A group of Maderists may have tried to liberate their chief leader with the only result that of satisfying the public’s greatest need.

“Madero’s and Pino Suarez’s deaths were essential to the welfare of the country; it is a sorry thought, however, that only their tragic fate could have insured permanent peace for our country.”

Thus we find two contradictory reports. The first can be suspected on account of its official origin, for the government may have had an interest in misrepresenting the facts. The second is quite as suspicious as the first, for it had no basis of fact and is little more than gossip told by one or several persons who had not witnessed the deed.

It may be said in favor of the first version that the government did not have to resort to such stratagems in order to bring about the execution of Madero and Pino Suarez; it could have proceeded in their case as it did in the case of Gustavo Madero and Baso; or it could have, in order to avoid responsibilities, sent them before a drum head court-martial which would have tried them summarily and ordered their immediate execution. Moreover, the case was referred to the relevant courts in

order that a regular inquiry be held; when the inquiry was completed, the court declared that no one could be held on account of the shooting. From the point of view of the courts, the legal truth was therefore that no crime had been committed and that the official version was the truthful one.

I would like finally to add this: an anonymous accuser, public opinion, charged the government with having assassinated Madero and Pino Suarez. When the case came to the courts, no one rose to sustain the charge, no one presented any evidence, except circumstantial evidence. What importance can one attach to such anonymous accusations?

The most one can do in this case is to suspend judgment; in the jurisprudence of all countries the defendant should be accorded the benefit of the doubt; nowhere can any one be put in jeopardy for a deed, unless it has been demonstrated beyond cavil that the deed was committed and that the defendant was guilty of it.

I shall now sum up this first part of my book. I believe I have proved to my readers' satisfaction the following facts:

1. That Francisco I. Madero was a disturber of the public peace and the leader of a revolution in which all the ills for which the Mexican Republic is now suffering had their inception.

2. That Francisco I. Madero took control of the presidency merely on the strength of the revolution.

3. That Francisco I. Madero violated repeatedly the federal constitution and the election laws.

4. That the administration of Francisco I. Madero was positively disastrous for the country.

5. That the counter revolution, or in other words, the movement directed against the Maderist administration, was a necessity created by the government itself.

6. That Francisco I. Madero was responsible either directly or indirectly for the slaughter of peaceful people which



GENERAL GREGORIO RUEZ

went on in Mexico City during the Bloody Ten Days.

7. That Francisco I. Madero was directly responsible for the execution of General Gregorio Ruiz, Deputy to the Congress of the Union, without previous process of law, although the constitutional guaranties had not been suspended in the federal district and General Ruiz was covered by his parliamentary immunity.

8. That Francisco I. Madero killed with his own hand Lieutenant Colonel Teodoro Jiminez Riveroll when the latter presented himself before him, in compliance with his superior's orders, to ask him respectfully to tender his resignation.

9. That there is no legal proof, but merely a chain of circumstantial evidence to sustain the charge that General Huerta ordered the assassination of Francisco I. Madero and of José Pino Suarez. If the declarations of the government are not sufficient one must either produce evidence or suspend judgment, and in case of doubt no sentence can be passed.

It may be fitting to repeat here what I

wrote in the concluding paragraph of the preceding chapter: "This does away with the main objection which the government of the United States has raised to recognizing our provisional government. This objection is totally unfounded or rather the foundation upon which it reposes is either a mistaken notion or a lie."

CHAPTER VII

“THE CASE OF MEXICO”—PRESIDENT WOODROW WILSON—THE AMERICAN POINT OF VIEW.

I must begin by confessing that until recently I had always considered the Hon. Woodrow Wilson, President of the United States, as a pure idealist. After watching him at closer range, speaking with people who have known him intimately for many years and studying his political career I have modified my opinion of him.

There are in Mr. Wilson two very well defined personalities: The philosopher who in his speculations arrives at idealistic conclusions, and the positivistic politician, energetic, unyielding. It seems as though his political creed was that it is better to be difficult to dissuade than easy to persuade.

He has the ability to impart to his policy an appearance of idealism and to con-

vince his friends, as well as his enemies, that they are dealing with the most stubborn schoolmaster instead of with the most astute politician that the United States has ever bred.

I have noticed, not without surprise, that this so-called idealist who is supposed to know nothing whatever of practical politics, has forced a recalcitrant congress to adopt two important measures to which important sections of the three great parties had previously declared their bitter antagonism.

If you care to trace his earlier record as governor of New Jersey, the conviction will grow upon you that Machiavelli would have been clay in Wilson's hands, and what is more, that Machiavelli would never have known it! If you follow him still further back, and scrutinize his career as president of the miniature republic at Princeton, you will gather the most enlightening evidence of all; for eleven years, facing conditions indescribably unfavorable to his program, he so thoroughly dominated the forces align-

ed against him that every one of his plans was finally carried out. And yet, when he left, his enemies agreed in saying of him, with the contemptuous pity of the practical man for the thinker: "Yes, a brilliant man, a wonderful dreamer, a great student, but too set in his ways. He will not give way even in minor matters in order to get his way in big ones. He's obstinate, impolitic, unpractical. He's not enough of a politician for a job like this!"

Whether he is or is not a politician, whether he is practical or unpractical, the fact remains that Mr. Woodrow Wilson made his way to the Presidency of the Republic. It is true that he reached that position by a mere accident, but he reached it just the same.

Let us now consider the conditions as Mr. Wilson found them when he assumed the presidency. He was chosen by a minority of the voters, and though the opposition is divided, it is quite unanimous in wishing him ill. The government at Washington is an endless game of politics

for politics' sake. If by any trick or manoeuvre either of the two elements bitterly hostile to Wilson and to all he stands for, could compromise him in the eye of the country, his power to carry through the program to which he is pledged, would come to an abrupt end. For though he has a nominal party behind him, it must not be forgotten that his party is made up of heterogeneous elements so oddly-matched, that it is laughable to see them in even a temporary accord. The Democratic Party, even in its palmy antebellum days, was a house divided against itself; in those days North against South, at present East against West in its opinions. It ranges from Bryanism at one extreme, to the ultra-conservatism of Parker at the other. It includes the unspeakable Tammany element in New York and the blue-blooded aristocracy of the Southern States. Its present majority in congress does not correspond to any majority of the voters, and this accidentally established majority is itself so heterogeneous that only a master in the

game of politics could possibly hope to unite it in support of a definite, sane policy. Let us remember that from 1856 to 1913 the Democratic Party has been very seldom able either to put itself in power, or when it has accomplished this, to maintain harmony within itself long enough to carry out even a plank of its program.

Behind the Democratic congress there stands no real popular force, save the negative power of divided opposition, an opposition which may unite at any time to drive Democracy out of power.

The voter of this country gleans his political preferences almost entirely from the newspapers, the majority of which are opposed to Wilson. Wilson is like a general, commanding a small force of exceedingly unreliable troops, officered by ambitious and jealous subordinates, and wholly surrounded and outnumbered by foes, momentarily at odds with one another. Should the opposition press solidly united against him he would fail as pitifully as Cleveland did.

Such a man in such a situation had

to cope on the very first day of his administration with a foreign complication which has not the remotest bearing upon the program which he pledged himself to carry out. He had to solve a question upon which it is impossible to secure trustworthy information. His agents disagree radically in their reports. He considers the most important of them Mr. Henry L. Wilson, for whom I have the greatest esteem, as avowedly hostile to him personally and politically. Whatever his final decision may be he knows in advance that the opposition will condemn it. If he is not very careful he may involve the country in a war which would spell disaster in more ways than one.

Mr. Wilson's policy in regard to Mexico is well summarized in the following letter written to me by a clever American journalist:

"Wilson knows that in the country, among the classes from which he draws support and to which he must look for its continuance, there is a strong hostility to bloody tactics, and a consequent dislike of

those on whom a blood suspicion rests. He knows, as any newspaper reader must know, that any appearance of friendship with Huerta would compromise him in the eye of the real governing class of the country. He knows, too, that every opposition newspaper in the land is ready to attack him the instant he takes this course, and that the attack will find a ready sympathy among the stable element of the population. Indeed, many of the hostile papers, surveying the situation, have already reached the conclusion that the administration will be compelled to recognize the *de facto* government as also the government *de jure*, and on this supposition, have already begun to condemn any such recognition, and in some cases, even to demand excitedly that the United States intervene at once to reestablish the remnants of the fallen government. This chorus swells and rises while Wilson waits and ponders and inquires, a well known habit of his. He rarely acts until he knows all there is to know about what he is doing. The wolves and jackals of the

press are pressing him close, ready to spring upon him the moment he takes what they never neglect to call the bloody hand of Huerta.

"Wilson plays his favorite game. He takes a lofty stand. He refuses to countenance Huerta by any formal recognition. Here you have your Puritan. I believe he followed, as he always has followed, the dictates of his conscience, but I am very sure that in so deciding he knew that he was outwitting his foes as cleverly as he always does. He left the opposition press gasping. It has to commend his decision, it had to cease howling him down, and to praise him instead. And the great majority of sober citizens up here had nothing but praise for his course. It left him firmly in control of his destinies, with a tight grip on his congress and with the country confident that he might be trusted to keep us out of warfare, at the worst, and at the best, might bring us through the crisis with honor and profit.

"That you and I happen to know how erroneous the information was as regards

Huerta, that we happen to have a clear understanding of the actual conditions of Mexico, is merely our good fortune. You have no idea of the mass of outrageously false information on the subject which has filtered through our press into our public during the past nine months. The average citizen here knows nothing more about Huerta than that it is difficult to pronounce his name and that he is strongly suspected of having committed a rather contemptible murder. Carranza, Villa, Zapata and the rest are only names to us. We look at the headlines each morning with a languid curiosity, and if no officer, smoking a cigarette gaily while the firing party took aim, has been executed, we turn to the more diverting debate on our tariff or our currency.

“Now, in estimating President Wilson’s acumen, please consider it from the American point of view, for it is from that point of view that he had necessarily to adopt his course. Whatever may be best for Mexico, however clearly he may recognize it, it is none the less his paramount

duty to do what is best for the United States. And if we had to reach a conclusion as to what is best for the United States, you and I, following his reasoning, would both arrive at precisely his conclusion.

“For, first of all, he must at all costs avoid any entanglement. You will admit that in recognizing neither of the parties he played safe in that respect. You will also admit that there was an undeniable risk of entanglement in recognizing Huerta; for once having done so, we should be under some obligation in the matter of compelling the rebels, if successful, as they might easily have been, according to the best judgment we could form, to live up to the obligations assumed by Huerta in regard to the other nations and their citizens. Moreover, had we recognized Huerta, we would necessarily have placed ourselves in a position hostile to the irresponsible but all-powerful rebel forces, and thus exposed our own citizens and their properties, to reprisals which

would have called loudly for intervention."

I have thought it necessary to draw a picture of President Wilson as I visualize him today, and to produce all the available facts in order to explain, not to justify, his attitude toward the "Case of Mexico" in order to impart to this study of the situation absolute impartiality, and to disprove in advance any charge of bias that might be made against me. My jealous patriotism could no more excuse or justify such a mistake on my part than Mr. Wilson's jealous patriotism, whether we consider Mr. Wilson as a mere man, or as President, could excuse his policy toward Mexico.

To explain the motives of some one's conduct is not to justify them.

CHAPTER VIII

THE POLICY OF PRESIDENT HUERTA—THE “COUP D’ETAT.”

The state of affairs obtaining in Mexico on February 18, 1913, was similar to that which obtained in France on February 24, 1848. A historian of that epoch describes it as follows: “It was a body without a soul, a ship without a rudder, a fleet without an admiral, a house without a master, a nation without a ruler, a virgin land without an owner. In whom should the Power, the Authority be vested? In the first occupant. The ground belongs to the first occupant. If the occupation of the ground is the origin of property, the assumption of the power is the necessary condition for its existence.”

With Madero’s advent the old order passed, but no new order was ushered in; at least we failed to see that new order, no faintest outline of it appeared on the horizon. Maderism inherited all the debts of

Porfirism. Facing terrible difficulties, many of which it had created itself, it failed, or did not try, to surmount any of them. Its task was extremely arduous and it certainly showed itself unequal to it. It neither reformed nor reconstructed. It gave to the people neither the order nor the freedom promised them, nor the prosperity it had led them to expect; it did not even lay the corner stone of the democracy it had heralded so loudly.

The Mexican people were not really revolutionary. Madero made them so, and they have remained so.

The revolution which resulted from the San Luis manifesto, like all the revolutions which degenerate into hysteria, led unavoidably to the coming of a Caesar, a Cromwell, or a Napoleon. Why not of a Washington? Simply because revolutions that degenerate into hysteria do not produce that type of men. Even a Washington would prove a failure in such cases; a Washington could unite into one nation homogeneous racial elements; he could not control the heterogeneous elements of

a disorganized society and weld them into a nation.

After the fall of Madero, Mexico was no man's land; it was at the mercy of the first who would dare to take it. No civilian, however, was able to accomplish that feat. That was a soldier's job. Then appeared General Huerta, who saw his opportunity, when so many were hesitating, so many afraid, and so many indifferent. He felt it was his patriotic duty to take the situation in hand.

We must remember that at that precise moment there were only two men fit to assume the supreme power: Felix Diaz and Victoriano Huerta. Both wanted it, Felix Diaz for a later date when the elections would take place, Huerta wanted it at once, ready as he was to assume all the responsibilities and to cope with all the difficulties. Felix Diaz was the theorist, Huerta the practical man. Felix Diaz was advised by idealists and amateur politicians; Huerta followed only his own advice. Felix Diaz knew what he wanted; Huerta wanted what he wanted. Felix

Diaz was hesitating; Victoriano Huerta never vacillated. Felix Diaz proved to be a real man; Victoriano Huerta a sterling character.

The rebels of the citadel thought that Huerta was the last card they should play in order to win the game, and they played it; they thought that the victorious general would be a tool in their hands; he became, instead, the supreme arbiter with well-defined plans in his head. He had not longed for the supreme authority, but when it became his, he had the will-power to exert it.

Once established in the presidency, he set out to remove, without haste, but quickly and cleverly, whatever constituted an obstacle to the realization of his political and patriotic projects. The pact of the citadel, owing to which he had become leader of the revolution and arrived at the presidency through the regular constitutional procedure, was a binding agreement. He did not break it, but he saw to it that both parties agreed to let it remain a dead letter.

The cabinet appointed in compliance with that pact was preposterous. The president realized that with such collaborators, every one of whom represented a different political tendency and had a different origin, it would be impossible for him to follow any logical policy. After cancelling the pact he eliminated one minister after another, retaining only one whom he thought could work harmoniously with him. Even this one, however, was eliminated as soon as Huerta came to consider him as useless and dangerous.

General Felix Diaz was to him a disturbing element, not as man nor as officer, but as leader of a political party, in fact of the only party of real importance. He prevailed upon Felix Diaz to join again the army with which he was no longer officially connected. He restored him to his rank and conferred upon him the badge of a military order, thus retaining him as a subaltern of the president of the Republic. He entrusted him later with a most flattering mission

abroad, which made it difficult for him to return in time for the general elections, although he had full authorization to return whenever he deemed fit. After Felix Diaz's departure the Felixist party found itself practically decapitated. Felix Diaz was nothing politically without his party; the Felixist party derived all its importance in election time from the presence of its leader. Felix Diaz gone, the Felixist party and its candidate were eliminated from the contest and President Huerta was able thereafter to attend undisturbed to his work of reconstruction.

The houses of Parliament proved to be an obstacle to the pacification of the country; General Huerta made them realize that he was perfectly able to do without them whatever he had set out to do with them. He tried his best to impress his will upon the Chamber of Deputies, which was the more turbulent of the two, but when he saw that nothing could be accomplished through suasion and that the Chamber was becoming a nest of con-

spirators, when he was convinced that the only alternative was to eliminate Parliament or be eliminated by it, he resolved upon a coup d'état.

The American government was greatly exercised over the happenings of the Bloody Ten Days, over the stories circulated by the Maderists, and the protest of the Madero family, and it assumed from the first a markedly hostile attitude towards President Huerta, indeed refusing to recognize him. It was not possible to eliminate the American government as President Huerta had eliminated the other obstacles; to the impulsive American diplomacy, President Huerta opposed the Mexican diplomacy of passive resistance, thus preserving a status quo which has lasted over nine months; during that time the Americans have exhausted every form of threat; while the Mexicans, following the maxim which says: "Do not worry and nothing will happen," have opposed to them the force of inertia.

Viewed from the proper angle, the ac-



GENERAL PASCUAL OROZCO

tions of the rebel bands did not trouble him; on the contrary, they rather served his purpose; the rebels were such a burden to the country that the population, alarmed, harrassed, humiliated and covered with ridicule, would finally rise in anger against them and become the most powerful weapon for their destruction. Huerta had shown how indispensable he was in warfare against the rebels, and this made his position more secure. The government at Washington would also be driven some time into comparing the methods of Huerta's government and those of the rebels, and could no longer either help them directly as it had been doing, or help them indirectly as it had threatened to do. This would first contribute to a pacification of the country and eventually oblige the American government to recognize the Mexican government, already recognized by almost every nation in the world. General Huerta considered that the rebellion, with its orgy of brutality, carried in itself

its own condemnation and its death sentence.

Such was, in its main lines, the policy of President Huerta: A rigidly straight line when it came to laying plans, a series of bold curves when it came to the ways and means; it had, in brief, the essentials of any clever policy.

* * *

Among the charges brought against President Huerta, especially in the United States, we may mention that of executing a coup d'état, a thing unknown in the United States.

Francis Bulnes, a well known Mexican publicist, who is not connected in any way with the present government, published, a few days after the dissolution of the Chambers, an article in which is to be found, if not an approval of that exceptional act, at least an explanation and a general justification of it.

"A coup d'état," Bulnes wrote, "is a hygienic measure against the demagogic rabble when it seizes the powers of government and keeps the population terri-

fied by its excesses, or its propensity to commit excesses. A coup d'état is also a weapon against dreamers and deluded reformists, who, as soon as they gather political strength, set out to govern an absolutely imaginary population or become fanatics and show themselves more arbitrary, more cruel, more predatory than the demagogues themselves. Whatever the case may be, the lowest classes find themselves in a state of trepidation, for the government, weakened by its inability to govern with a majority of the nation, is no longer in a position to protect them; they are filled with a deep hatred for the tyranny of the aristocrats, of the demagogues, and of the impulsive, unbalanced prophets. A coup d'état executed by a liberator, be he sincere or hypocritical, is always beneficial to the lower classes which always welcome it with pleasure and gratitude, and give their assistance to their liberator, be he real or false, reserving themselves the right to hate him when his imposture is exposed."

This has been fully confirmed by history from the famous coup d'état, the first in date, executed by Cromwell, to the one which we are now discussing, not to forget the many which took place in France.

After the 23rd of April I came to the conclusion that a coup d'état would be inevitable, and in the various articles which I published in *La Tribuna* of Mexico City, and in *La Revista de Yucatan* of Merida, I did my best to show to the Chamber of Deputies that they were provoking that step, making it in fact necessary. Let us cast a retrospective glance upon what took place in the two years previous.

On May 26, 1911, General Porfirio Diaz and Ramon Corral tendered their resignation as president and vice-president of the Republic. The Chamber of Deputies accepted it, and the 1st of June, that is a week later, issued a call for extraordinary elections in order to fill the vacant posts. At the end of the Diaz regime all the governors of States aban-

doned their positions, some tendering their resignations, some asking for indefinite leave, and being replaced by partisans of Madero.

On February 19, 1913, President Francisco I. Madero and Vice-President Pino Suarez tendered jointly their resignation, which was accepted at once by the Chamber of Deputies. The governors of States, however, did not follow their example, nor did the Chamber issue at once a call for extraordinary elections, as it had done after the fall of President Diaz. The explanation of this is that General Diaz's resignation was final and in good faith, while Madero's was merely a makeshift, a subterfuge to save his life and escape jail; but he always hoped to return to the fight, waving the banner of legality. Madero was not the only person to nourish such hopes; all his followers held the same view, and even after Madero and Pino Suarez had disappeared, they clung to the idea of a restoration that would bring back into power, if not the leaders themselves, for

that was impossible, at least the system. Madero was dead but Maderism had survived him.

The Maderists thought that their overthrow was only temporary, an accidental loss easily recouped. They resorted to conspiracy; they soon raised the standard of revolt, and the Porra group, which predominated even in the Chamber of Deputies, assumed the leadership of all the intrigues and the rebellion.

President Huerta acted in obedience to the constitutional provision, according to which a call must be issued for extraordinary elections as soon as the presidency and the vice-presidency are vacant; in March he gave to the permanent commission of the Chamber of Deputies an order to issue the call so that the elections could take place on July 27; he considered that in four months there would be plenty of time to organize the various parties, select candidates, conduct campaigns and attend to the various preliminaries of an election. That order created a scandal among the Maderist

deputies. The minister of State, Alberto Garcia Granados, was bitterly attacked for the "haste" with which he had transmitted the order to the permanent commission, only a few days before the opening of the Chamber.

The regular session of the Legislature opened April 1st and the Chamber of Deputies discussed the order of the executive. On the 23rd of that month I published in *La Tribuna* an article entitled, "A Grave Problem Must Be Solved," in which I said among other things:

"A deep divergence of opinions exists among the deputies to the Federal Congress; some consider this disagreement as scandalous, some rejoice over it, but the greater part of the nation feels very nervous over it. This divergence of opinion is due to shady motives, to political intrigues absolutely foreign to sane politics, to personal ambitions, to the desire of a certain group to prolong the uncertainty in order to foster anarchistic designs. The question is not as to whether it was convenient or not to

issue a call for the elections, but whether or not the constitutional provisions should be respected. Viewing the problem from this angle, and it should not be viewed from any other, there is only one alternative: either adhere to the constitutional principle, regardless of consequences, or violate the constitution; in the latter case the Chamber of Deputies would execute a coup d'état, that is, usurp the power arbitrarily, resort to extraordinary and violent measures and amend the charter without observing the procedure demanded by the law.

"The Chamber is confronted by the following dilemma: Either the constitution pure and simple, or a military dictatorship."

Yielding at last to the insistence of the executive, of which the reader must make a mental note, the Chamber resolved to issue the call, selecting October 23rd as the date of the elections and hoping that in the interval some incident would make this decree void. If the elections had taken place in July, as President Huerta

wished it, a coup d'état would not have been necessary on the part of the executive.

In a memorandum sent on November 8 to the diplomatic corps, Mr. Moheno, minister of foreign affairs, outlining the policy of President Huerta, expressed himself as follows on this particular point:

“In order to carry out the second part of his programme (holding the elections) the Executive bowed respectfully before the sovereignty of the other powers; unfortunately one of the Chambers vested with the legislative power, the Chamber of Deputies, pretended to encroach upon the privileges of the Executive power and refused in certain cases to recognize the judicial power; the attitude of several deputies, who, protected by their parliamentary immunity, were intriguing openly and even taking part in armed revolts, made it impossible for Parliament to work in harmony with the Executive power. As no government can accomplish anything without that harmony, the

President of the Republic saw himself compelled to dissolve the Chamber of Deputies; this step was necessary to save the Republic and to forestall the anarchy which would have undoubtedly set in if open rebellion had been tolerated within one of the constituted powers. As the Senate could not constitutionally legislate alone, the Congress was declared dissolved. It never was the desire of the Executive, however, to govern extra-constitutionally; he therefore issued at once a call for congressional elections, and he simply assumed, in the interval, extraordinary privileges in the departments of finance, state and war, whenever this appeared indispensable. He did this with the solemn understanding that he would render full account of his use of such privileges to the new Congress as soon as it would be in session. The provisional government took also very good care to respect and to sustain the judicial power which continued to discharge very actively its august mission to protect individual guaranties; these guaranties were never

abolished by the administration except on such occasions when this was made necessary by the condition of civil war which still prevails in several parts of the Republic."

The reader may remark: "This is a dictatorship!" Well, it is.

In an article I published on May 13, 1913, that is five months before the coup d'état, I made the following statements:

"Let us leave aside all fancy conceptions, all romanticism; let us not get drunk on sonorous sentences; let us not deceive the people with tinsel and idle speeches; let us face the situation courageously, call a spade a spade, tell the truth, nothing but the truth.

"In politics situations are more important than theories.

"I shall be absolutely frank. I am speaking in my own name, not in behalf of any party, nor even of a small coterie, and I assume the entire responsibility of my statements. I am opposed to a dictatorship, but I am more strongly opposed to anarchy; if it is anarchy we are

facing (and it may be that we are actually on the verge of it), I prefer a Mexican dictator to a foreign invader and conqueror; for it is a foreign invasion which is being precipitated by the machinations of the revolutionists, bandits, conspirators, and the miserable intrigues of many men whose sacred duty it would be to save their own country.

"If some day a dictatorship succeeds in saving the country, I, for one, in spite of my liberalism and of my democratic instincts, will be the first to acclaim it; for to me the interest of the country is the first and most important consideration."

In the address which he read at the opening of the new Legislature, President Huerta said with his usual frankness:

"Judging the situation calmly, I cannot see that the constitutional order of things was interfered with through the dissolution of the Chamber, except when the executive power began to invade the sphere of action of the other powers. Be

it as it may, however, it will always be a high and noble duty, or at least a commendable attitude to save a nation at the cost of all principles; what is the good of preserving, at the cost of the nation's life, rigid and inert theories whose fairness and usefulness will always remain subject to discussion; the ultimate truth is to be found in that saying of Bonaparte's: 'In saving the country one does not violate any law.' "

CHAPTER IX

“THE MEXICAN PROBLEM” — PRESIDENT WILSON’S ATTITUDE CONSIDERED FROM THE POINT OF VIEW OF REASON AND JUSTICE.

If the president of the United States had merely refused to recognize the provisional government of Mexico, I would say that he had made use of an inprescriptible right. Almost every nation in the world recognized that government officially, some immediately, some a while later, in spite of the implacable hostility President Wilson has manifested towards President Huerta, a hostility which seems to be the consequence of a personal dislike rather than that of a political attitude.

So it is apparently; in reality it is a part of a programme cleverly thought out by a man of great ability and of noted tenacity. “The Mexican problem” is a convenient excuse for carrying out that programme; and President Wilson, with

the most perfect scorn for idealism, never misses any opportunity to carry it out.

Instead of keeping his hands off the national affairs of Mexico he interferes with them in order to fit them to his purpose. He first sent to President Huerta emissaries who asked for his resignation, a request which Huerta roundly denied, to his honor and to the honor of Mexico. Had Huerta complied with the orders sent from Washington he would have been both a coward and a traitor. A coward if he had yielded to the threats of a declared enemy; a traitor if he had accepted the protectorate of a foreign nation, the dictatorship of a foreign government. The very minute that crime would have been committed Mexico would have lost its political autonomy. Mexico would have been compelled henceforth to apply at the White House for its powerful host's advice as to who might be *persona grata* as president. And any time that president would have failed to give satisfaction to the United States an

emissary would have been sent to ask for his resignation.

After this, not only would the United States have exerted a direct suzerainty over Mexico, which is the object of its ambition, but Mexico would have virtually become an American colony.

Some pretend that Mr. Wilson's attitude was prompted by a desire to help in a neighborly way the settlement of our domestic troubles, for a reconciliation of all the parties could have been brought about more easily, they say, had Huerta resigned. This is a pure supposition. The truth is that when Mr. Wilson decided upon that step the rebellion had barely begun and had not assumed any importance. When he threatened President Huerta, however, the rebels thought they had found an ally in the American government, they breathed more freely, nourished greater hopes, and the rebellion began to spread.

The pretext which Mr. Wilson gave for not recognizing Huerta was that he could not sympathize with a man who had

assumed the power to further his interests and his personal ambition. This is what he said a few days after his election to the presidency; in an address he delivered at Dwarthmore, Pennsylvania, he was more explicit: "No government can exist," he said, "which is stained with blood or which is not governing with the consent of the governed."

In August, 1913, Mr. Wilson decided to take action in regard to the Mexican problem and entrusted John Lind, ex-governor of Minnesota, with a confidential mission to Huerta. While Mr. Lind's mission was of a diplomatic character, nothing could have in reality less conformed to diplomatic usage, for Mr. Lind carried no credentials accrediting him as official representative of the Washington government in Mexico, or as President Wilson's confidential agent.

The instructions he received from his government had, at least as far as they are known, the character of an ultimatum.

Mr. Lind's instructions were to "press

very earnestly upon those who are now exercising authority or wielding influence," that "the government of the United States does not feel at liberty any longer to stand inactively by while no real progress is being made toward the establishment of a government in the City of Mexico which the country will obey and respect." The president continued:

"A satisfactory settlement seems to us to be conditioned on:

"(a) An immediate cessation of fighting throughout Mexico; a definite armistice solemnly entered into and scrupulously observed.

"(b) Security given for an early and free election in which all agree to take part.

"(c) The consent of General Huerta to bind himself not to be a candidate for election as president of the Republic at this election, and

"(d) The agreement of all parties to abide by the results of the election and cooperate in the most loyal way in organ-

izing and supporting the new administration."

He added:

"If Mexico can suggest any better way in which to show our friendship, serve the people of Mexico and meet our international obligations, we are more than willing to consider the suggestion."

It seems almost incredible that such suggestions could have been made in absolute earnest. And yet, in spite of their unusual and humiliating character, the Mexican government considered them carefully. In a perfectly courteous note, containing now and then, however, some veiled sarcasm, Mr. Huerta answered that he could not promise to stop the hostilities nor enter into a definite armistice with unorganized groups of bandits; the freedom of elections would of course be protected, but the government could not guarantee that all the parties would abide by their results and cooperate in organizing and supporting the new administration. The demand that General Huerta should not run as candi-

date in the presidential elections could not be considered, for besides being unusual and unjustifiable, such a demand could appear inspired by personal animus; the Mexican citizens alone could decide that question at the polls.

How did President Wilson imagine that President Huerta could effect a compromise in behalf of the rebels and bandits in league against his administration? And even if Huerta had had the boldness to make such an agreement, what confidence could it have inspired to the United States?

Finally President Wilson did not know, when he made his third suggestion, that this point was already settled by the Mexican constitution, which absolutely forbids the immediate election of the provisional president.

Mr. Wilson is intelligent and cultured enough to understand that his suggestions could not have any favorable effect, as their wording was offensive. To consider General Huerta, not as president of the Republic but as governor of Mexico, was

to offer him an insult. To suggest an arrangement presupposing impossible conditions was merely farcical. The shrewd and illustrious Mr. Wilson never intended to settle the Mexican difficulties. He had a different object in view. What was it?

In the message he read to the American Congress on December 2nd, 1913, he had the following to say to the Mexican question:

“There is but one cloud upon our horizon. That has shown itself to the south of us, and hangs over Mexico. There can be no certain prospect of peace in America until General Huerta has surrendered his usurped authority in Mexico; until it is understood on all hands, indeed, that such pretended governments will not be countenanced or dealt with by the government of the United States. We are the friends of constitutional government in America; we are more than its friends, we are its champions; because in no other way can our neighbors, to whom we would wish in every way to make

proof of our friendship, work out their own development in peace and liberty. Mexico has no government. The attempt to maintain one at the City of Mexico has broken down, and a mere military despotism has been set up which has hardly more than the semblance of national authority. It originated in the usurpation of Victoriano Huerta, who, after a brief attempt to play the part of constitutional president, has at last cast aside even the pretense of legal right and declared himself dictator. As a consequence, a condition of affairs now exists in Mexico which has made it doubtful whether even the most elementary and fundamental rights either of her own people or of the citizens of other countries resident within her territory can long be successfully safeguarded, and which threatens, if long continued, to imperil the interests of peace, order, and tolerable life in the lands immediately to the south of us. Even if the usurper had succeeded in his purposes, in despite of the constitution of the Republic and the rights of its people, he would

have set up nothing but a precarious and hateful power, which could have lasted but a little while, and whose eventual downfall would have left the country in a more deplorable condition than ever. But he has not succeeded. He has forfeited the respect and the moral support even of those who were at one time willing to see him succeed. Little by little he has been completely isolated. By a little every day his power and prestige are crumbling and the collapse is not far away. We shall not, I believe, be obliged to alter our policy of watchful waiting. And then, when the end comes, we shall hope to see constitutional order restored in distressed Mexico by the concert and energy of such of her leaders as prefer the liberty of their people to their own ambitions."

I may now ask if the situation the Mexican government is facing is such as Mr. Wilson pictures it, who is mainly responsible for it? Who but the man who, witnessing the failure of his "policy of persuasion," antagonized the government

(not of Mexico City but of the immense majority of the Mexican Republic), allowed the rebels to supply themselves with arms and ammunition, and to raise money and even recruits in American territory, the man who established a "pacific blockade" of all our ports, advised the European markets to refuse further loans to the provisional government, tried to prevail upon the foreign powers to break up their relations with that government and did his best to discredit, to starve, and to ruin Mexico.

Hasn't the Honorable Mr. Wilson given thereby effective assistance to the rebels? Hasn't he thus conducted against the provisional government a campaign more ruthless, more active, and more efficient than the campaigns conducted by Zapata, Villa, Carranza, and other rebel leaders?

That he favors the rebels is obvious. Last December Rear Admiral Cowles of the American navy received prominent Sinaloa rebels on board the *Pittsburg* and entertained them as though they were

representatives of a friendly and duly recognized government. An effort was made by the secretary of the navy to explain this partiality to the rebels, which constituted an insult to the provisional government, by saying that the honors accorded to the revolutionary chiefs were justified by the fact that those men were the lawfully elected authorities in the State of Sinaloa. This explanation was published broadcast in American newspapers.

The New York *Times* mentioning the incident printed a statement made by a prominent Mexican statesman, member of a faction which is not supporting Huerta, but which is not favorable to the rebels either. It reads:

"This is not the first time that Washington has gone out of its way to insult Huerta gratuitously. It seems evident that the Washington officials want to provoke Huerta to the point that he will commit some overt act, thus giving Washington a way out of the present muddle.

“Huerta has thus far abstained, and is keeping his temper remarkably in the face of repeated affronts of the United States. It is improbable that he will commit any overt act on this occasion. All thinking Mexicans must realize that the President is acting for the best good of the country in this way.”

New York *Times*, Dec. 28, 1913.

Is this really Mr. Wilson's aim? Is he simply waiting until Huerta gives him a plausible pretext for a more direct intervention in Mexico? If so, what would Mr. Wilson and the United States gain by it? God preserve the United States and Mexico from a war. It would be a scandal for humanity, a disaster for everybody concerned; for Mexico it would spell ruin, for the United States disgrace. Mr. Wilson can not drag his country into such an abyss.

Does he wish to help the triumph of the revolution? May Mr. Wilson remember his own statements and think of what that triumph would entail.

Let us make for the sake of argument the absurd supposition that President Huerta, yielding to President Wilson's demands, might tender his resignation. Let us first settle two important points:

1. President Wilson stated to the entire world that he would never recognize any act of President Huerta's. Would he recognize his resignation?

2. President Wilson also stated that he would consider as illegal the results of the elections to be held on October 26, 1913, not only as far as the president and vice-president, but also the senators and deputies then elected were concerned.

To whom, then, could President Huerta tender his resignation? Not to the Mexican Congress as constituted at the time of Madero's fall, since it was dissolved; nor to the present Legislature, since it has not been recognized by Mr. Wilson. Mr. Huerta could solve the difficulty by tendering his resignation to the Supreme Court of the nation, which constitutes the third power. This would be perfectly legal. Whom could the

Supreme Court, however, appoint as provisional president? Neither the secretary of foreign affairs, nor the secretary of state, nor any other member of the cabinet designated by the constitution, since these men were all appointed by President Huerta and are therefore disqualified. Should the Supreme Court appoint a private citizen, this appointment would be illegal. The president thus appointed would find himself in a position even more illegal than that of the present president, who, much as Mr. Wilson may deny it, was selected in accordance with all the constitutional provisions. In any case, wouldn't the private citizen selected illegally by the Supreme Court be more or less directly a creature of the revolution?

We are told that another way of solving the problem would be to give assistance to the rebels. Since we have been making many suppositions, let us suppose that assistance given the rebels in violation of all ethical principles enabled them to triumph. Would the great jurist, Mr. Wilson, recognize as legitimate

the government raised to power by their triumph? According to his theories, to his explicit and final statements, he could not.

There is still another solution, one which in certain quarters is regarded as the most likely to bring definite results: armed intervention by the United States. What would be the consequences of an intervention? I have already answered that question: to eliminate the government of President Huerta, to put down the rebellion, and also I suppose to destroy the robber bands, to pacify the country by suasion and force, and finally to prepare the general elections which would be held freely and legally under the protection of the American military forces.

How many years would it take to carry out that plan which both federals and rebels, in a word, the whole Mexican population would oppose? Would the government ushered in by such means be in any way legal? Would it be in harmony with our national laws, with the

rights of the people? Would it not be merely an emanation of the most odious oppression?

An intervention would be difficult in theory, ineffective in practice.

Whether our government is legal or illegal is a question which it behooves only ourselves, the Mexicans, to decide. If we are satisfied with it the foreign powers are in duty bound to recognize it. One may argue that at present one part of the population is satisfied with it, while another part is proclaiming its dissatisfaction, arms in hand. This does not give foreign nations any right to interfere in our affairs. On one side there stands a government *de jure* and *de facto*, on the other various rebel factions; in international law the former only is to be considered; of course, the latter could be recognized as belligerent, but this can only be done for serious reasons and according to certain precedents.

I have not mentioned thus far any of the numerous and weighty arguments advanced by a part of the North American

press in condemning Mr. Wilson's policy, nor the opinions expressed by Latin Americans and European authorities which are also adverse to the course followed by the illustrious President of the United States in regard to the "Mexican problem". I did not see the necessity of mentioning them; the personal arguments I have presented are amply sufficient to prove that President Woodrow Wilson may not have overstepped the limits of a very special policy of his own. He strayed, however, beyond the limits of reason and justice. He is one of the men, perhaps the man, whom history will hold responsible for the situation with which the Mexican Republic is confronted to-day.

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CHAPTER X

THE VARIOUS PHASES OF THE MEXICAN
REVOLUTION—THE ATTITUDE OF PRESI-
DENT HUERTA AND ITS MEANING—ITS
INTERNATIONAL IMPORTANCE.

Few people, especially in the United States, realize the various aspects which the Mexican revolution has successively taken, and the actual meaning of President Huerta's attitude.

When Francisco I. Madero began his fight against President Diaz he was actuated by democratic motives.

The dictatorship of Porfirio Diaz had in the long run become unbearable, for the "Scientific Group," headed by Minister Limantour, opposed the introduction of any new elements into government circles.

Francisco Madero was unknown in the political world. He suddenly blossomed forth as a writer and a politician. He published a book, the "Presidential Prob-

lem," in which he expressed rather timid views. He had been born and raised in the atmosphere of Porfirism and he didn't presume to revolt against tradition. That book, however, gave him a certain measure of notoriety.

Thereupon our new author went into active politics, organized clubs, and started on a series of speaking tours, preaching the democratic gospel; and finally accepting the nomination for the presidency of the Republic.

The hostility he encountered on the part of the government transformed the timid writer into a daring political leader, and the political leader into a revolutionary chief. He was arrested by order of the government, released on bail, issued a revolutionary manifesto in San Luis Potosi, and then fled to the United States.

Madero's first activity was actuated by hostility to President Diaz. He wished to overthrow him. Later on he thought of assuming the presidency himself. When he issued his manifesto he

broadened his democratic ideas so much that they actually verged on socialism. To win partisans to his cause he pandered to the lowest classes and especially to the Indian population. In the third paragraph of his San Luis manifesto he said:

“Through a vicious interpretation of the unimproved land law, many small land owners, most of them Indians, have been dispossessed, either by decrees of the secretary of public works or by judgment of the Courts of the Republic. It is elementary justice to return to their owners or to the latter’s heirs the land of which they were despoiled through such immoral practices, besides indemnizing them for the losses thereby incurred.”

The lower classes placed an exaggerated construction upon this promise and expected that all the land be divided up among them after the landlords had been expropriated. The rabble turned Maderist, and our country had to face one of the most appalling social problems. Madero preached the theory; the deplorable Zapata brothers put it into practice.

Such is the origin of Zapatism as it exists today.

Madero triumphed. As it is one thing to be a pretender and another to be a ruler, Madero realized what consequences the fulfilment of his hastily made promises would have, and he broke his word. The rabble, however, would not be satisfied, and instead of socialism we had anarchy.

There were then two revolutionary factions; one was opposing Madero because he had not kept his political promises and established a true democracy, and had, on the contrary, disregarded scandalously the expressed will of the people and installed a family oligarchy in power; another faction was hostile to every form of government and declared its intention to take possession by violence of all land, killing of the landlords, and resorting to pillage and arson. This was the advent of the olocracy. Madero convinced himself that while a revolution can be accomplished with the help of the rabble, one cannot govern it.

What Pancho Villa, the rebel leader, is now doing is the consequence of the promises Madero once made.

The fall of Madero was only a national incident, and so was the Pact of the Citadel. When Huerta triumphed he had to cope with the anarchistic condition created by Madero, and with the intrigues and agitations of the Maderists. The latter were rising everywhere to avenge Madero's death, and they failed or refused to realize that to avenge one man's death they would have to sacrifice thousands of innocent lives, and compromise the dignity of their country, if not jeopardise its independence.

When General Huerta became provisional president he had few illusions about the situation. He realized the magnitude of the task which he had undertaken and the responsibilities he was assuming. He had, however, to pacify the country at any cost, without wasting time on metaphysical speculations.

Unfortunately the newly-elected government of the United States headed by

President Woodrow Wilson, actuated by motives which no one has explained satisfactorily and in which some see very wrongly an exaggerated form of puritanism, made plans for overthrowing Huerta and extending an American protectorate over Mexico. From that time on the fall of Madero assumed an international importance; it ceased to be a purely Mexican question and became an issue between the United States and the government of Mexico.

I must repeat that any concession made by President Huerta under the pressure of President Wilson's demands would have been prejudicial to Mexico, as it would have implied the acceptance of a tutelage, the first phase of an actual protectorate which would have fatally resulted in the destruction of Mexico's national autonomy.

President Huerta understood that very clearly from the very first; besides he saw in the attitude of the United States a first attempt at establishing the American domination over the entire North-

ern half of the continent, whence it could later be extended to South America. The Mexican problem became henceforth a question affecting the entire American continent.

In an address he delivered at Mobile in October, 1913, President Wilson endeavored to appear as an idealist; whoever watches him closely, however, will find under the idealist a politician following a very practical line of conduct.

Mr. Wilson began by stating that the United States would never acquire another square foot of land by conquest.

Did he imply that all other means were legitimate in acquiring the lands of neighboring countries, such means for instance as were employed in Panama or are, at present, in Nicaragua?

In the course of his address Mr. Wilson said that for motives of "morality" and a "love of constitutional liberty", not "for expediency", the United States desired to help the Latin-American republics to an emancipation from "hard

bargains" forced on them by foreign concessionaries and money lenders.

He added: "What these states are going to see, therefore, is an emancipation from the subordination which has been inevitable with foreign enterprise. Interest has been exacted of them that was not exacted of anybody else, because the risk was said to be greater, and then securities were taken that destroyed the risks. An admirable arrangement for those who were forcing the terms.

"I rejoice in nothing so much as in the prospect that they will now be emancipated from these conditions, and we ought to be the first to take part in assisting in that emancipation.

"We must prove ourselves their friends and champions on terms of equality and honor."

I will then ask with Mr. George Harvey: "Now, what can this mean? That literally we shall forbid South American Governments to make further concessions to European capitalists? Or merely

that we shall insist upon supervising the trades and fixing the terms?"

Neither of those things is within the reach of the United States, and every nation on the American continent would revolt against such pretensions, which clearly reveal the United States' desire to exert a suzerainty over all the Latin American countries.

Mr. Wilson is not the originator of this doctrine; he is only one of its exponents and one of those who are trying to put it into practice. This is only one phase of the imperialistic policy with which all Latin-Americans are perfectly familiar, which they have analyzed closely and which they all condemn unreservedly; it is not the spoken word to which they pay much attention but the designs back of the words; they remember that whoever would harm us, glibly assures us that it is all done for our own good.

In refusing to comply with President Wilson's demands, President Huerta not only upheld the interests of Mexico

but made himself truly the champion of all the nations south of the Rio Grande.

The Mexican problem, however, is much more than a continental problem; it is actually an international problem; it is bound to interest every civilized nation of Europe and America, since the President of the United States has formally declared his intention to pry into every financial deal, and every possible concession contract entered into by Latin American Republics with a citizen or a corporation of the Old World. If that plan were carried out, the United States would be absolute master of the situation, it would gradually control every enterprise, perhaps even every industry in our various countries.

And yet Americans are the first ones to obtain onerous concessions and to invest capital in foreign countries. Mexico has seen them at work. Mexico has had a painful experience with its oil industry, in which American and English capitalists are in open rivalry, a rivalry which the rebels have cleverly taken ad-

vantage of since the first day of the Madero uprising, a rivalry of which the provisional government is still bearing the brunt.

Thus it is that President Huerta, by opposing the encroachment of a monopolistic imperialism, is upholding not only the interest of Mexico and of the Latin American nations but those of the whole world.

Why has Mr. Wilson abandoned so completely the traditional policy of the United States? This policy had always accorded with the definition which President Franklin Pierce gave of it on May 15, 1856, in his message to Congress:

"It is the established policy of the United States to recognize governments without question of their source of organization or of the means by which the governing persons attain their power, provided there be a government *de facto* accepted by the people of the country. . . . It is the more imperatively necessary to apply this rule to the Spanish-American peoples in consideration of the frequent

and not seldom anomalous changes of organization or administration which they undergo and the revolutionary character of most of the changes."

Times have changed; so have this country's aspirations, and consequently its traditional policy has been cast aside.

What is at the bottom of the personal and implacable hatred for Huerta which the Honorable Mr. Wilson reveals even in his official acts, as one can see from the various statements of his which I have quoted in this book? It is due to the fact that General Huerta proves an obstacle to the fulfilment of President Wilson's designs; Mr. Wilson is also prompted by an extremely human feeling: Nothing is more aggravating for a strong man than to see a man he considers as weak resisting him openly, and showing himself intractable.

The more I study the Mexican problem the more I am convinced that it lacks intrinsically the international character which we are attributing to it. It is nothing more than a conflict between the

Wilson Doctrine, successor to the Monroe Doctrine, and the indomitable attitude of Huerta, patterned after the attitude of our immortal patriot Juarez.

Between Wilson and Huerta the world will decide.

CHAPTER XI

THE WILSON POLICY CONDEMNED BY THE
ENTIRE WORLD—HUERTA THE MAN OF
THE SITUATION—TIME A SOLUTION
SHOULD BE FOUND—THE SOLUTION—
MEXICO'S VITALITY.

The Wilson policy has been condemned by the entire world. The Americans residing in Mexico, who are well qualified to speak of what is taking place there, what is to be feared or hoped for, have protested against it. Prominent members of the American colony called upon Mr. Wilson in a body for the purpose of conferring with him and supplying him with accurate information; those men told me, however, that the president refused to receive them, on the plea that he was not soliciting opinions regarding Mexico. Many newspapers of the United States have published very illuminating articles showing the mistake which President Wilson is making.

All over Latin America, from Cuba to

the Straights of Magellan, the problem has been discussed from every angle, and the conclusions reached have been uniformly adverse to the Wilson policy.

The majority of the English, French, German and Spanish papers have condemned it; some have even gone so far as to prefer grave charges, which I consider unfounded if not slanderous, against Mr. Wilson, accusing him, for instance, of venality, an absolutely inadmissible charge.

The conservative papers of all those countries are unanimous in stating that, considering the anomalous conditions through which our country is passing, General Huerta is the indispensable man of the hour, the only man perhaps who has the necessary qualifications to re-establish order, the only one, in any case, who can protect fully the lives and interests of foreign residents.

I admit that every man should be guided in the accomplishment of his task by idealistic motives; his feet, however, should remain on the ground.

I also believe that a faith which is not constructive is a negation, a delusion, or a form of hypocrisy.

The future does not belong to those who would impose their ideas through violent gestures, violent epithets, or violent deeds; but to those who can reorganize society on a better basis, and unite men in order and harmony.

I cannot believe that President Wilson is planning to precipitate a war between the United States and Mexico. If the Wilson policy has not as its sole aim an armed intervention and the conquest of Mexico, or of a section of it, Mr. Wilson should direct all his energies towards the resumption of an harmonious *modus vivendi* with Mexico; he should abandon his hostile attitude and avail himself of the best diplomatic assistance.

When Mr. Wilson sent Mr. Lind as his confidential agent, or in whatever capacity it may have been, a thing which has never been definitely ascertained, to present to President Huerta the inadmissible requests I have previously men-

tioned, President Huerta was tactful enough to offer a counter proposition which, if it had been accepted, would have solved the difficulty.

The perfectly dignified suggestions made by the Mexican statesman covered two points:

1. That the Mexican Ambassador to Washington be received.

2. That the United States send a new ambassador to Mexico without any prior conditions.

Those two points encompassed a vast program; to enter into relations and to discuss the situation through diplomatic channels, with due regard for good form.

Mr. Wilson must be aware of the fact that in international negotiations good form is indispensable for the arrival at a perfect understanding.

Sympathies and prejudices should be set aside for the sake of convenience, reason, and justice.

In politics there is no worse adviser than self-conceit.

It is high time an end should be put to

the present situation, which is anomalous, dangerous, and inexcusable, and greatly prejudicial to both Mexico and the United States.

Mr. Wilson must not be blind to the facts. He must realize that, notwithstanding his attitude of hostility to President Huerta, the latter has remained in power and has by this time completed his first year in the presidential chair. He must realize that, notwithstanding the boycott directed against the provisional government, it has succeeded in supplying itself with arms and ammunition, enlisting men and raising money; money has been contributed voluntarily in Mexico and abroad, for the patriotic endeavors of President Huerta are inspiring more confidence than the inexplicable doings of the American Government. He must realize that notwithstanding the direct assistance the rebels have found in the United States, and the moral help the American Government has given them indirectly, they are less than ever likely to triumph; a few victories won in the

frontier states where the American influence is the most effective, mean little or nothing. In the rest of the country the government retains the upper hand, and Huerta has succeeded in limiting and localizing the insurrection. Mr. Wilson must realize that the triumph of the rebels would prove disastrous for Mexico and would imperil its institutions, its social order, and the legitimate interests of all foreign residents, not excluding the American residents.

The Honorable Mr. Wilson has only one alternative; either order an armed intervention, a course which he pretends he does not contemplate and which I contend he has neither the right nor the power to resort to; or rely entirely upon diplomatic action. An attitude of watchful expectancy does not constitute a solution. It constitutes a real danger; it is in the last analysis, inaction due to ignorance of whatever action should be taken.

Of all the sensible suggestions which have been made in connection with the

Mexican problem, the most judicious and practical are to be found in a brilliant article published by Colonel George Harvey in the *North American Review*.

Mr. Harvey has reached the conclusion that the policy inaugurated and carried out by Mr. Wilson can only lead to a war as odious to the Americans as to the Mexicans "to whom we are anxious to show our good will".

"The only alternative, apparently," Mr. Harvey writes, "is that indicated above, namely, a reversal of the attempt at dictation by means of an unworkable Imperialism.

"Is not that possible?

"Nobody here or abroad, and nobody in Mexico who needs be considered questions the high purpose which has actuated President Wilson. Nobody suspects his good faith, the purity of his motives, or the pacificatory nature of his methods. Nobody doubts that he has done his best, and nobody can demonstrate that another could have done better.

"But the policy which ~~the~~ president

sincerely believed to be the wisest has failed. Why could and why should he not now address the *de facto* Government of Mexico substantially as follows:

“ ‘We have exerted our best endeavors, according to our best judgment, to aid in restoring peace and prosperity to you, our neighbors, and our friends. We have been disinterested, as you know; but our suggestions, having failed to meet with the approval of either the provisional government or of the commander of the insurrectionary forces, have necessarily proved unavailing.

“ ‘Deeply as we regret this circumstance, we frankly admit it to be a fact. But it is the accomplishment, not the method, that we still regard as vital.

“ ‘We have tried our way in vain. Now we stand ready to try yours.

“ ‘Your Ambassador will be received in Washington. We will accredit a new Ambassador to you “without previous conditions.”

“ ‘We shall hold your government responsible for the lives and properties of

all foreign residents, and shall notify other nations to that effect. All of our dealings with your Administration will be in the open, in good faith, and in sincere hope that a truly representative and stable Government may soon be established, to the end that, within a reasonable time, peace and prosperity may be regained in all parts of your distracted land.'

"We hear the objections to this new policy. It would be unfair to the Constitutionalists and rebels. But, since their leader has repulsed our attempts at mediation, what further claim have they upon our consideration?

"It would strengthen Huerta, or Blanquet, or Moheno, or whoever may be in control when these words reach the public ear and mind. That cannot be helped. We must strengthen somebody, and apparently there is little room for choice.

"It would be inconsistent with our declared attitude, would be a recession on the part of the president, would humiliate

us as a nation in the eyes of the world. Perhaps, yes; and for that very reason it would live forever as a performance and an example, as the noblest act ever done by a great and powerful nation in the interest of a weak and suffering people.

“And it would avert war—at least for time sufficient to allow for adjustment and mutual understanding. That is the overpowering consideration which should, and, we hope, may influence a president who surely must realize that he is not merely the tribune of a people, but is also the head of a nation which should set the pace for all the world in works of self-abnegation tending to universal peace.”

If I or some other Mexican had put forward such arguments, they would lose much of their value; they would appear inspired by personal bias, by national preferences; the writer might give the impression that he was begging for mercy. Coming from an American, a democrat, and a sincere patriot, from one of the most illustrious figures in American journalism, they have an inestim-

able value, and should make a deep impression on Mr. Wilson. If he disregards such advice he may some day have a heavy conscience.

If any one insinuates that by making those arguments mine I assume the attitude of one begging for mercy, I shall not repudiate the charge. I am ready to sacrifice anything for my country's sake, be it my life or even my honor, which is dearer to me than my life.

Mexico is now in the throes of terrible convulsions, but it is not dying, far from it. All the events that have taken place in my country since 1910 are only evidence of its prodigious vitality. Notwithstanding all the efforts we have made to divide ourselves into ferocious factions, which like tornadoes sow desolation wherever they pass, Mexico is living, striving, and has faith in itself; not only will it regain the prestige and prosperity it enjoyed until recently, but its future will prove greater than its past.

This terrible period of disorder has been

fertile in lessons by which we will profit in the future.

Let us beware in politics of stagy attitudes and of well sounding platitudes. The former mean nothing, the latter prove nothing.

We will have to rebuild upon our ruins, and we shall build a new edifice according to new plans. In the mental realm we are always building upon disillusionments, but we generally use our disappointment as cement.

We must proceed according to the order of the creation; first there must be light, that is peace; then out of the ethnical clay we hold in our hands we must mould a nation and breathe into it a national soul. Such is the task we will consummate, thus we will discharge our sacred duty as patriots and members of the human race.

Will the Honorable Mr. Wilson, the enlightened president of the powerful American Republic, collaborate in this work of pacification, of redemption, and of uplift of a nation? Will he do it as an

idealist, a puritan, a philosopher, a politician, a practical man, or as what? May he do it very soon for the weal of Mexico, for the honor of the United States, and for his own glory. He has only to take one step backward, I mean a step forward, and confirm by deeds what he promised by word of mouth.

If he can devise a way better suited to his nation's temperament and to his own personality, more effective and more dignified as far as Mexico is concerned, he may speak out; we shall surely find that solution agreeable, and General Victoriano Huerta will be the first to reconcile himself to it; as a man, as a citizen, as a soldier, and as president, he has only one aim: the salvation of the country.

I state this fact before the entire world with the deepest conviction of its truth.

New York, January, 1914.

